Metarepresentational phenomena in Japanese and English

Implications for comparative linguistics

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Contrastive studies of languages usually focus on differences in lexical items, syntactic structures, semantic expressions, collocations, and so on. In the present paper we take a cognitive pragmatic approach, assuming that metarepresentation in the sense of Sperber (2000) and Wilson (2000) offers a crucial perspective in such studies. We discuss how the speech act component of higher-level explicatures is linguistically realized in Japanese and English, focusing on sentence adverbials, 'because' clauses, speech act particles, reported speech, private predicates, and desiderative predicates. We conclude that in the Japanese language, information concerning the speech act component tends to be linguistically realized, while such information is not necessarily realized in English. We suggest that this cognitive pragmatic approach can be applied to other languages where higher-level explicatures are basically explicit as in Japanese or implicit as in English.

Keywords: relevance theory, comparative linguistics, metarepresentation, higher-level explicaures, linguistic realization, speech act component.

1. Introduction

Grice (1989) distinguishes 'what is said' from 'what is not said,' referring to the latter as 'implicature.' However, the distinction is not so simple: 'what is said' and 'what is not said' are not actually complementary to each other. We must also take into account what is not said when we interpret 'what is said.' In other words, what is explicitly communicated is in fact much richer than 'what is said.' Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995) coined the word 'explicature' on the analogy of 'implicature' to cover this innovative view. Explicatures are obtained through the processes of disambiguation, saturation, free enrichment, and ad hoc concept formation (Carston 2002).

Wilson and Sperber (1993) introduced 'higher-level explicature,' which is realized by an implicit verb phrase set higher than what is explicitly stated, i.e. the 'basic explicature,' mainly reflecting the speech acts performed and the

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speaker's propositional attitudes. (2a–c) are possible higher-level explicatures of Mary's utterance in (1) when it is uttered with appropriate paralinguistic features such as facial expression, gestures, and intonation.

(1) Peter: Can you help?

Mary (sadly): I can't.

(2) a. Mary says she can't help Peter to find a job.

b. Mary believes that she can't help Peter to find a job.

c. Mary regrets she can't help Peter to find a job. (Wilson and Sperber 1993)

'Say' in (2a) indicates a speech act, while 'believe' in (2b) and 'regret' in (2c) imply Mary's attitudes towards the proposition 'she can't help Peter to find a job.'

Metarepresentational aspects of communication is one of the major topics in relevance theory. It can be said that the discussion started in Sperber (1994), followed by Sperber (2000), Wilson (2000), Noh (2000), Sperber and Wilson (2002), Uchida and Noh (2018), and Noh (2021), among others. Wilson (2000) notes that a metarepresentation is "a representation of a representation: a higher-order representation with a lower-order representation embedded within it." If the original representation is the speaker's own thought, it is a case of first-order metarepresentation, and if it is someone else's representation, it is a second-order metarepresentation (Noh 2021).

Linguistic phenomena of higher-level explicatures and metarepresentations are, as it were, two sides of the same coin: the former is concerned with what the speaker communicates and the latter with what the addressee interprets. That is to say, the addressee tries to entertain what the speaker intends to communicate from the basic and higher-level explicatures. For example, if Peter processes Mary's utterance in (1), he may interpret it as conveying one of the candidates in (2). It might be the case that not only the basic explicature "Mary can't help Peter to find a job" but also "Mary says" in (2a), "Mary believes" in (2b), and "Mary regrets" in (2c) are metarepresented in Peter's mind, reflecting higher-level explicatures of Mary's utterance. They can be paraphrased as follows:

(3) a. Peter: [Mary says [Mary can't help Peter to find a job]]

b. Peter: [Mary believes [Mary can't help Peter to find a job]]

c. Peter: [Mary regrets [Mary can't help Peter to find a job]][1]

(3a) shows that Peter metarepresents what Mary says, and (3b) and (3c) are Peter's metarepresentations of what she believes and what she regrets

[1] As noted by one of the reviewers, the paraphrases in (3) are examples of 'second-order' metarepresentaion in the sense of Wilson (2000) and Noh (2000). Metarepresentations, whether first-order or second-order, are linguistically related in some way in languages like Japanese, as we discuss below. We mention these two types of metareprentation in Section 3, where information from metarepresentation is crucial.

respectively. According to Sperber (2000, 3), (3a) to (3c) are examples of 'mental representation of public representation,' while if Peter said 'Mary said she can't help,' it would exemplify an example of "public representations of public representations." The present paper primarily focuses on the descriptions of metarepresentations in utterances and discusses how such information is linguistically realized in Japanese and in English. The discussion leads to a conclusion that metarepresentational perspectives are an encouraging approach to comparative studies in languages.

In the following section we show how higher-level explicatures or metarepresentation processes are reflected in Japanese and in English. Section 3 discusses cases involving inflection in Japanese. Section 4 is the conclusion.

2. Realizations of metarepresentations

We saw in (1) above that paralinguistic features may provide us with information on various higher-level explicatures and that the metarepresentations can be shown as in (3). There are, of course, linguistic devices that perform the same functions as those features. In this section we observe such linguistic facts both in Japanese and in English.

Metarepresentational adverbials

There are some sentence adverbs which are related to the realization of basic or higher-level explicatures.[2] Let us call such adverbs 'metarepresentational adverbials' if metarepresentations are implicitly or explicitly incorporated in them. Consider the following utterances with -ly adverbs:

(4) a. Mary: Generally, French wine is superior to Australian wine.

b. Mary: Technically, French wine is superior to Australian wine.

(5) a. Mary: Frankly, French wine is superior to Australian wine.

b. Mary: Honestly, French wine is superior to Australian wine.

The basic and higher-level explicatures of (4) and (5) are seen in (6) and (7) respectively:

(6) a. [Mary says from a general point of view [French wine is superior to Australian wine]]

b. [Mary says from a technical point of view [French wine is superior to Australian wine]]

(7) a. [Mary says frankly [French wine is superior to Australian wine]]

b. [Mary says honestly [French wine is superior to Australian wine]]

It can be seen from (6) and (7) that those sentence adverbs, generally, technically, frankly, and honestly, behave in the same way in that they modify

[2] See Wilson and Sperber (1993), Ifantidou (2001, 97–118), and Carston (2002, 120–125) for relevance theoretic approaches to sentence adverbs.

the higher-level explicature verb say, but notice that (6) differs from (7) in quality. That is to say, generally and technically are concerned with the speech act aspect of higher-level explicatures and frankly and honestly with the propositional attitude, which can be confirmed from the fact that it is possible to paraphrase the utterances in (5) into (8) but not from (4) into (9).

(8) a. Mary: To be frank, French wine is superior to Australian wine.

b. Mary: To be honest, French wine is superior to Australian wine.

(9) a. Mary: *To be general, French wine is superior to Australian wine.

b. Mary: *To be technical, French wine is superior to Australian wine.

If we add the phrase ‘with you’ to the phrases in (8), it becomes even more evident that the utterances reveal propositional attitudes towards the hearer.

(10) a. Mary: To be frank with you, French wine is superior to Australian wine.

b. Mary: To be honest with you, French wine is superior to Australian wine.

If we translate (4) and (5) into Japanese focusing on the -ly adverbs, we get (11) and (12).

(11) a. Mary: Ippantekini iu-to, French wine is superior to Australian wine.

generally say-Quot

b. Mary: Senmontekini iu-to, French wine is superior to Australian wine.

technically say-Quot

(12) a. Mary: Socchokuni iu-to, French wine is superior to Australian wine.

frankly say-Quot

b. Mary: Shoujikini iu-to, French wine is superior to Australian wine.

honestly say-Quot

Speech act ‘saying that ...’, is required in Japanese. (13a) to (13d) are therefore not possible.

(13) a. Mary: *Ippantekini, French wine is superior to Australian wine.

b. Mary: *Senmontekini, French wine is superior to Australian wine.

c. Mary: *Socchokuni, French wine is superior to Australian wine.

d. Mary: *Shoujikini, French wine is superior to Australian wine.

In some cases, ‘-ly adverbs + speaking’ can be expressed by other constructions in English, as in (14):

(14) a. In other words, French wine is superior to Australian wine.

b. In short, French wine is superior to Australian wine.

c. To conclude, French wine is superior to Australian wine.

These sentence initial adverbials can be put into Japanese as follows:

(15) a. Iikaeru-to, French wine is superior to Australian wine.

say -Quot (in another way)

b. Kanketsuni iu-to, French wine is superior to Australian wine.

briefly say-Quot

c. Ketsuron-o iu-to, French wine is superior to Australian wine.

conclusion-Obj say-Quot

'In other words,' 'in short,' and 'to conclude' do not reflect the speech act component on the surface, but they clearly contain 'saying' in the higher-level explicatures.[3] We can trace back the process in iikaeru (=say in another way) and iu (=say) in (15), while in the English counterparts of (14) there are no linguistic markers to suggest speech act information.

The following are parallel constructions, where the speech act component is crucial for interpretation (Uchida and Noh 2018):

(16) a. Mary to Peter: John was killed last night, in case you haven't heard.

b. Mary to Peter: Since you know so much, why is Paul leaving?

c. Mary to Peter: (The door bell is ringing.) If that's John, I'm not here.[4]

d. Mary to Peter: Jill was pretty rude to me. I am neglecting my job!

On the surface there seem to be no logical connections between the two clauses in (16a) to (16d). We have to infer the information in order to bridge them. In (16a) Mary tells Peter the news presuming that he doesn't already know. (16b) suggests that Mary asks Peter assuming he knows the reason why Paul is leaving. In (16c) Mary asks Peter to tell the visitor that she is away if that person is John. (16d) is a kind of reported speech, suggesting that Jill is criticizing Mary. The verbs 'tell,' 'ask,' and 'suggest' are not realized in (16) but clearly communicated as the speech act component of higher-level explicatures. These processes of interpretation are intuitively clear to native speakers of English, but Japanese people may find it quite difficult to understand the meaning of these utterances. If we translate the utterances in (16) into Japanese, we get those in (17), where the italicized parts are required in Japanese.

(17) a. In case you haven't heard ii-masu ga (=I tell you), John has left.

b. Since you know so much kiki-masu ga (=I ask you), why is Paul leaving?

c. (The door bell is ringing.) If that's John, I'm not here to itte kudasai (=tell him).

d. Jill was pretty rude to me. I am neglecting my job to iunda (=she says)!

[3] akemore (1996) takes the same standpoint in that 'in other words' and 'in short' put constraints on higher-level explicatures as reformation markers.

[4] Sweetser (1990) classifies 'because' clauses into three types; content, epistemic, and speechact types. The use of the 'since' clause of (16b) corresponds to the speech act domain. cf. footnote 5.

The inserted Japanese phrases reflect the higher-level explicatures of the related clauses in (16) and the utterances sound unnatural without them.

We observed above that higher-level explicatures are reflected in some metarepresentational adverbials and that information concerning propositional attitudes is linguistically realized both in English and Japanese, while information implying speech acts should be linguistically realized in Japanese but not necessarily in English.

2.2 '..., because ...' construction

As is often pointed out, there are two types of 'because' clauses following main clauses: those with a comma and those without, as in (18):

(18) a. Mary: Peter couldn't walk straight because he was drunk.

b. Mary: Peter was drunk, because he couldn't walk straight.[5]

In (18a), his being drunk caused Peter not to walk straight, while in (18b) knowing that he couldn't walk straight caused Mary to conclude that Peter was drunk.

With no comma as in (18a) 'because' clauses are subordinated to the main verb clauses and internally processed in the utterance. In 'comma+because' utterances like (18b), the speaker's assertion or conclusion is presented first and the reason for saying or thinking so follows. Wilson (2000) mentions a similar example when discussing cases where higher-level metarepresentations need not be linguistically marked.

(19) It's raining, because the grass is wet.

She states that the causal relation is found between a state of affairs and an utterance or thought in (19), where the hearer "must construct a higher-order representation of the type 'she says', or 'she thinks', and attribute it as part of the speaker's meaning." (Wilson 2000, 431) (19) corresponds to (18b) in our analysis and both 'because' clauses mean that 'the reason for saying or thinking so is as follows.' There are typical translation patterns in Japanese for those two types of 'because' clause: (...) (da)kara/(na)node ... (da) for the former and (...) to-iu-nowa ... (kara)-da for the latter. With this in mind, the utterances in (18) would be translated as in (20).

(20) a. Mary: Peter wa yopparatte ita –node massugu arukenaka-ttan da. (because he couldn't walk straight, he was drunk)

b. Mary: Peter wa yopparatte itan da, to-iu-nowa massugu aruke nakatta kara(-da). (because he couldn't walk straight, he was drunk, that's what she said)

Node in (20a) remains within the scope of the clause 'he couldn't walk straight' and literally equals 'since' or 'because.' On the other hand, in (18b) there is no counterpart to to-iu (=to say) in (20b). The complement of to-iu in

[5] According to Sweetser (1990, 76–78), (18a) and (18b) are cases of the content domain and the epistemic domain respectively, and Rutherford (1970) calls the 'because' clause of (18a) the restrictive use and that of (18b) the non-restrictive. However, neither Sweetser nor Rutherford mention the speech act performed by saying 'Peter was drunk.

(20b) is that Peter was drunk and the 'because' clause is supposed to be an explanation for what the speaker said. Therefore, the metarepresentations of (20a) and (20b) could be something like (21a) and (21b), respectively.

(21) a. [Mary says [Peter couldn't walk straight because he was drunk]]

b. [Mary says [Peter was drunk] because he couldn't walk straight]

It is clear from the paraphrases of (21) that the use of 'because' in (18b) explains the reason why the speaker said 'he was drunk.' In other words, in (18a) the 'because' clause refers to the main verb phrase and in (18b) to the speech act component of the higher-level explicature 'Mary says.'

The analysis discussed above may remind us of the 'performative hypothesis' proposed by Ross (1970). Indeed, there are linguistic data evoking 'performative analysis' and appealing to English native speakers' intuition, but one of the crucial defects of the hypothesis is that it was purely a syntactic analysis.[6] As we saw, the complex mechanism involved is basically pragmatic rather than syntactic, and there are in fact a number of advantages to taking a pragmatic approach.

See Levinson (1983, 246–263) for a detailed description of the performative analysis.

Linguistic realizations of speech acts

Japanese sentence final particles have invited considerable discussion, but thus far, no one has proposed a metarepresentational approach. Let us focus on differences in realizing higher-level explicatures between Japanese and English concerning speech acts of utterances. First, take the simple English sentence in (22):

(22) He is a linguist.

Sentence (22) could be a response to a number of questions and statements, including the following:

(23) a. Who is a linguist?

b. What does Tom do?

c. Tom is a lawyer.

d. What did Jane say?

When (22) is a response to (23a), 'he' is to be stressed, while on the other hand, 'linguist' will receive the major stress if it is meant to be a reply to (23b). If (22) is uttered as a refutation of (23c), the contrastive stress will fall on 'linguist.' If it is a response to (23d), it is a report of what Jane said. (Reported

[6] Ross (1970, 254–258) does mention 'pragmatic analysis' as an alternative to the performative analysis and concludes that the pragmatic analysis would be a notational variant of his performative analysis. In his view of pragmatics, the utterance 'Prices slumped' has a 'deep' structure such as [Prices slumped] instead of [I say to you prices slumped], but, as we have seen, one of the explicatures of 'Prices slumped' would be [The speaker says [prices slumped]], where the speech act component is explicitly stated and is not to be deleted. The main reason that Ross didn't give value to pragmatics at that time might be that pragmatics was not as cognitively oriented as it is today. See the explicature analysis proposed in Uchida (2011, 145–158).

speech is to be discussed in Section 3.1.) That is, prosody will be different depending on the situation, but the linguistic form 'He is a linguist' remains the same.

The Japanese responses corresponding to (23a) to (23d) would be (24a) to (24d), respectively.

(24) a. Kare ga gengo gakusha da.
he Nom[7] linguist is
'He is a linguist.'
b. Kare wa gengo gakusha da.
he Top linguist is
'He is a linguist.'
c. Kare wa gengo gakusha da-yo.
he Top linguist is-Part
'He is a linguist.'
d. Kare wa gengo gakusha da-tte.
he Top linguist is -(hear-say) Part
'He is a linguist.'.

Ga in (24a) implies that kare (=he) is new information while wa in (24b) introduces a topic in the sense of Kuno (1973). Da in (24a) to (24d) is a sentence final particle indicating the speaker's judgement.[8] Yo in (24c) typically conveys new information, and tte in (24d) is an informal version of to itta (=said that ...), marking the rest of the sentence as information reported by someone else.

The point here is that a single linguistic form like (22) can be expressed by at least four patterns in Japanese. In other words, the basic explicature 'he is a linguist' is the same in both languages but prosodic information will be added in English while case-marking particles and sentence final particles are required in Japanese.

Sentence final particles in Japanese can allow for manifest speech acts to be conveyed (Uchida 2013, 95–96). Suppose that Mary says (25) to Peter.

(25) Tom is coming toward us.

Utterance (25) can convey a number of speech acts. Some of them are given in (26) below (Uchida and Noh 2018).

(26) a. [Mary informs [Tom is coming toward us]] (informing)
b. [Mary warns [Tom is coming toward us]] (warning)
c. [Mary confirms [Tom is coming toward us]] (confirmation)
d. [Mary expects [Tom is coming toward us]] (expectation)

[7] Ga and wa are both nominative case-marking particles and wa also works as a topic marker
[8] Da and noda are both sentence final particles, but da follows after nouns and noda comes at the end of predicates.

In English explicit linguistic devices suggesting each speech act are not necessarily required. Those different speech acts can be reflected in sentence final particles in Japanese, as in (27):

(27) a. Tom is coming toward us -yo.

b. Tom is coming toward us -zo.

c. Tom is coming toward us -ne.

d. Tom is coming toward us -na.

Yo in (27a) tells Peter that Tom is coming while zo, typically used by men, warns him that Tom is coming. Ne in (27c) is often used to confirm information and na in (27d) suggests that the speaker expects something to happen.

Again, we can say that what is linguistically realized in English is the basic explicature of (25) as discussed in the case of (22), but in Japanese those speech acts of higher-level explicatures in English must be expressed with various sentence final particles.

An interesting phenomenon occurs in the use of ‘why’ (cf. Uchida 2011, 72–81). Consider the following exchanges.

(28) Mary: I believe him.

Peter: Why?

(29) Mary: I don’t believe him.

Peter: Why not?

It is logical that ‘Why?’ in (28) means ‘Why do you believe him?’ and ‘Why not?’ in (29) ‘Why don’t you believe him?’ Let us call these responses Verb Phrase Agreement (henceforth VPA).

Note, however, that there is another way to respond to ‘I don’t believe him.’

(30) Mary: I don’t believe him.

Peter: Why?

‘Why?’ here is to be interpreted as ‘Why do you say so (=Why do you say that you don’t believe him)?’ We can call the response Speech Act Agreement (henceforth SAA) since it replies to what Mary just said. Consider the differences in interpretation by positing the following explicatures.

(31) a. [Mary says [Mary believes him]]

b. [Mary says [Mary doesn’t believe him]]

It is clear that VPA is concerned with the basic explicatures [Mary believes him] in (31a) and [Mary doesn’t believe him] in (31b), while SAA is concerned with the higher-level explicature [Mary says].

If this analysis is correct, ‘Why?’ in (28) can be processed in the same way. That is, ‘Why?’ in (28) is ambiguous between VPA and SAA. When we

put (30) into Japanese, two types of translation result, as in (32) and (33):

(32) Mary: I don't believe him.

Peter: Do shite? / Naze?

'Why don't you believe him?' / 'Why do you say that?'

(33) Mary: I don't believe him.

Peter: Do shite so iu no? / Naze so iu no?

'Why do you say that?'

The literal translation of 'Why?' is Do shite? or Naze? and these question forms can cover the two ways of agreement, VPA and SAA. On the other hand, Do shite so iu no? and Naze so iu no? are regarded as an SAA response to the utterance 'I don't believe him.'

Of interest is a parallel linguistic fact concerning VPA and SAA. Consider the exchanges in (34) and (35).

(34) Mary: People make mistakes.

Peter: (Yes,) they do. / (No,) they don't.

(35) Mary: He didn't say anything.

Peter: (No,) he didn't. / (Yes,) he did.

The utterances 'Yes, they do' and 'No, they don't' in (34) and 'No, he didn't' and 'Yes, he did' in (35) respond to 'People make mistakes' and 'He didn't say anything' respectively. It is VPA in that 'do' and 'don't' are used to refer to the verb phrase 'make mistakes.' We can also receive the following response to both (34) and (35).

(36) (Yes,) you're right.

In (36) the speaker means that 'what you've said is right.' That is, Peter agrees with what is asserted in 'People make mistakes' and 'He didn't say anything.' When the first utterance is an affirmative like (34), the interpretation of 'Yes, you're right' semantically appears to be the same as the VPA of 'Yes, they do,' while the speech act interpretation of 'Yes, you're right' would be quite different from the VPA when the preceding utterance is a negative, as in (35).

These two different interpretations can be explained in the same way as above. We can posit the candidates of higher-level of explicatures of Mary's utterances in (34) and (35) as follows:

(37) a. [Mary says/asserts [People make mistakes]]

b. [Mary says/asserts [He didn't say anything.]]

It is clear that VPA corresponds to the basic explicatures [People make mistakes] in (37a) and [He didn't say anything] in (37b), and SAA to [Mary says/asserts] in both (37a) and (37b).

In English there is no overt linguistic marker to distinguish between the two uses of agreement, especially when the preceding part is expressed in the

affirmative. Recall ‘you’re right’ in (36), where the utterance can be used in both ways. In Japanese, on the other hand, we have several phrases to specify the two different types of agreement.

Consider the following exchange:

(38) Mary: He didn’t say anything.

Peter: So. /[9] So da-ne.

‘Didn’t he? / He didn’t.’

So in (38) refers to the utterance ‘He didn’t say anything.’ To put it another way, so works to indicate grammatical agreement and cannot be used as a counterpart of ‘Yes, you’re right.’ Ossharu tori, on the other hand, would be used instead of So / So da-ne to indicate speech act agreement.

(39) Mary: He didn’t say anything.

Peter: Ossharu tori.

‘What you say is right.’

Ossharu tori implies that the speaker agrees with what the other party says. In other words, it responds to the higher-level explicature [The speaker says/asserts].

We also find similar phenomena in some uses of adverbs in English, as in (40) below:

(40) Mary: This novel is worth reading.

Peter: Certainly.

Peter’s ‘Certainly’ in (40) is ambiguous between (41a) and (41b).

(41) a. This novel is certainly worth reading.

b. Certainly you’re right.

(41a) agrees grammatically with Mary’s utterance in (40) and (41b) corresponds to the speech act of asserting of the utterance. However, if the first utterance is a negative as in (42):

(42) Mary: This novel isn’t worth reading.

Peter: Certainly not.

Here, ‘Certainly not’ emphasizes the negative assertion, aligning with the speech act agreement.

(32) Mary: I don’t believe him.

Peter: Do shite? / Naze?

‘Why don’t you believe him?’ / ‘Why do you say that?’

(33) Mary: I don’t believe him.

Peter: Do shite so iu no? / Naze so iu no?

‘Why do you say that?’

[9] This so here is a pronoun which refers to what is anaphorically mentioned and is quite different from -soo as an evidential marker, which Narrog and Yang (2018) discusses.

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(42) Mary: This novel isn't worth reading.

Peter: Certainly.

(43) Mary: This novel isn't worth reading.

Peter: Certainly not.

That is to say, 'Certainly' in (42) and 'Certainly not' in (43) mean (44) and (45), respectively.

(44) Certainly you're right.

(45) Certainly the novel isn't worth reading.

Those behaviors of 'certainly' can be nicely accommodated in the explanations of VPA and SAA discussed above: i.e. (41a) and (45) are cases of VPA and (41b) and (44) those of SAA. Adverbs which behave like 'certainly' include absolutely, definitely, maybe, perhaps, probably, and so on.

We have seen in this subsection that Japanese sentence final particles are responsible for the speech acts performed which can be shown in the higher-level-explicatures of the utterances. In English, on the other hand, there is no counterpart that performs the same functions.

3. Realizations of first- and second-order metarepresentations

When we feel something or we want to do something, the original state of affairs is crucially involved. In other words, first-order metarepresentation is

involved when the original state of affairs comes from the speaker herself/himself, while if another person tries to convey someone else's first-order metarepresentation it is a case of second-order metarepresentation. Depending on whether it is private or public, different linguistic realizations may result. We discuss such intrinsic and interesting linguistic behaviors in Japanese below.

Reported Speech

Reported speech is typical evidence of metarepresentation in that both first-order and second-order metarepresentations are basically involved, where the speaker attributes the source of the information to someone else. Suppose that Peter says 'Jane loves Tom' as a reply to Mary in (46).

(46) Mary: What did Tom say?

Peter: Jane loves Tom.

There is no problem in (46), but consider a literal translation to Japanese. (47) is not an utterance which is equivalent to 'Jane loves Tom' intended as a reply to Mary in (46).

(47)

?Jane wa Tom wo ai-shiteru.

'Jane loves Tom.'

A reporting verb is required there, as in (48):

(48) a. Jane loves Tom -to itta.

b. Jane loves Tom -tte.

'Jane said she loves Tom.'

'Jane said' in 'Jane said she loves you' is a part of the basic explicature of (48). This is yet another example of the linguistic fact that there exists a characteristic difference in realizing basic and higher-level explicatures between English and Japanese.

Based on this observation, we find that 'You've dropped your purse' in (49) can be ambiguous, with both (50a) and (50b) as possible interpretations.

(49) Mary: What did Jill say?

Peter: You've dropped your purse.

(50) a. Jill said you (=Mary) have dropped your purse.[10]

b. You (=Mary) have dropped your purse.

Possible Japanese translations corresponding to (50a) and (50b) would be (51a) and (51b) respectively. This can be shown as in (52).

(51) a. Kimino saifu ga ochita to itta / ochita-tte.

b. (Kimino) saifu ga ochita yo.

[10] Yet another interpretation, 'Jill said you (=Peter) have dropped your purse,' is also possible, but (50a) is a more likely interpretation.

(52) a. You've dropped your purse -to itta / -tte.

b. You've dropped your purse -yo.

Notice that to itta and -tte in (52a) and yo in (52b) are attached to the original English sentence. To itta consists of the quotative particle to and the verb iu (='say')

When we feel something or we want to do something, the original state of affairs is crucially involved. In other words, first-order metarepresentation is involved when the original state of affairs comes from the speaker herself/himself, while if another person tries to convey someone else's first-order metarepresentation it is a case of second-order metarepresentation. Depending on whether it is private or public, different linguistic realizations may result. We discuss such intrinsic and interesting linguistic behaviors in Japanese below.

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(51) a. Kimino saifu ga ochita to itta / ochita-tte.

b. (Kimino) saifu ga ochita yo.

(52) a. You've dropped your purse -to itta / -tte.

b. You've dropped your purse -yo.

Notice that to itta and -tte in (52a) and yo in (52b) are attached to the original English sentence. To itta consists of the quotative particle to and the verb iu (='say') -tte is a hearsay particle, so that both to itta and -tte tell us that the preceding section is being reported. Yo indicates that the speaker is telling the hearer information that he believes is unknown to the hearer at the time of the utterance.

Let us look at (49) to (52) above from the viewpoint of metarepresentation. The two interpretations of the ambiguous utterance 'You've dropped your purse' in (49) can be shown as (53a) and (53b).

(53) Peter: You've dropped your purse.

a. [Peter says that [Jill says Mary has dropped Mary's purse.]]

b. [Peter says that [Mary has dropped Mary's purse.]]

One of the interpretations, (50a), is given in (53a), incorporating the reporting verb phrase 'Jill says.' The other interpretation, (50b), would be (53b), which can be uttered in the case where Peter, the speaker, notices that Mary has just dropped her purse, leaving Mary's question unanswered. In contrast, the Japanese counterparts explicitly encode each piece of information, as in (54) and (55):

(54) a. You've dropped your purse -tte / to itta.

b. [Peter says [Jill says Mary has dropped Mary's purse]].

(55) a. You've dropped your purse -yo.

b. [Peter is telling Mary [Mary has dropped Mary's purse]].

As mentioned above, -tte or to itta is a reporting verb meaning 'say' and sentence final particle yo implies the transmission of new information and can be paraphrased by 'I'm telling you.' These items are obligatory in Japanese and (54a) and (55a) would sound odd if they were deleted.

Similar behaviors are observed in echo questions.[11] Take (56) and (57) as examples.

(56) Mary: You startled me!

Peter: Startled you?

[11] See Blakemore (1994) and Noh (1995, 1998, 2000) for relevance theoretic approaches to echo questions. Noh (1995) mentions that Korean and Japanese echo questions behave similarly. Iwata (2003) discusses an alternative analysis.

(57) Mary: He came by to see me.

Peter: He went to see you?

Peter echoes Mary's utterances with deictic items modified accordingly, meaning 'Did you say I startled you?' and 'Did you say he went to see you?' in (56) and (57) respectively. Here again, the reporting clause 'did you say' is not necessarily realized. How about the Japanese counterparts?

(58) Peter:

Kimi wo odorokaseta -tte / to iuno?

'Did you say (I) startled you?'

(59) Peter:

Kare ga kimi ni aini kita to -tte / to iuno?

'Did you say he came to see you?'

With appropriate rising intonation, the literal translations of Peter's utterances in (56) and (57) are not impossible, but those with the reporting clause -tte or to iuno as in (58) and (59) sound much more natural. Metarepresentational information concerning basic or higher-level explicatures involved in echo questions is most likely to be expressed linguistically in Japanese.

So far we have pointed out that in reported speech the speech act component of higher-level explicatures tends to be explicitly realized in Japanese but not always in English. In the following section we consider a slightly more complicated linguistic fact related to inflection in Japanese.

Metarepresentational Information in Inflection in Japanese

In this subsection we consider the fact that we can trace the source of information in inflection of some adjectives and verbs in Japanese and, furthermore, that the Japanese language has linguistic devices of inflection to convey metarepresentational information.

Private Predicates

Inner feelings or sensations such as joy, happiness, sorrow, grief, heat, cold, pain, and so on, can only be perceived by the individuals experiencing those sensations. That is to say, it is not possible for the speaker to describe the deeply rooted feeling of others, asserting that someone else is sad, hot or cold. But consider (60) below, where the experiencers are Sam in (60a) and Tom in (60b).

(60) a. Sam: I'm sad.

b. Sam: Tom is sad.

In (60a) it is the speaker 'I' who experiences the emotion, but in (60b) Sam says that Tom is sad, not himself. The same predicate 'be sad' is used in these two cases. In Japanese, on the other hand, we have to use different

predications based on the subjects.

(61) a. Sam:

Watashi wa kana-shii.

'I'm sad.'

b. Sam:

Tom wa kana-shigatte iru.

'Tom is sad.'

Kana-shii occurs with the first person subject and kana-shigatte iru with the third person subject. We cannot switch the forms, as seen below.

(62) a. Sam: *Watashi wa kana-shigatte iru.

b. Sam: *Tom wa kana-shii.[12]

This particular linguistic fact has been mentioned in Kuroda (1973), Kuno (1973), Aoki (1986), and Narrog and Yang (2018), among others. Let us consider Aoki (1986) below.

Aoki (1986) discusses Japanese usages such as (61) and (62) from the evidential point of view, claiming that the gar[13] of kana-shigatte iru is a verb which 'has the function of expressing inference rather than experience' (Aoki 1986, 225). According to him, Japanese evidentials, including gar, are not 'grammaticized.' However, the sentences in (62) are clearly ungrammatical, suggesting that there should be some restrictions.

Let me express (61a) and (61b) from the perspective of (meta)representation, as follows:

(63) a. [Sam says [Sam is sad]]

b. [Sam says [Tom is sad]]

(63a) and (63b) show that when the speaker is the same person as the subject of 'sad,' (kana) shii is selected and that (kana) shigatte iru occurs when the speaker is different from the subject of 'sad.' We can therefore posit the following hypothesis:

(64) Kana-shii co-occurs with the first person and kana-shigatte iru with the third person.[14]

(64) describes a simple and basic case. However, take the case in which other persons intervene between the speaker and the subject. In other words, consider the situation where the speaker reports someone else's inner feelings or sensations:

[12] This utterance is possible in the context of fictional discourse. See Kuroda (1973) and Uchida (2013, 142–144). If no-da (sentence final particle) or chigainai (=epistemic 'must') follows, kana-shii is also possible, where noda functions as a kind of marker of interpretive use in relevance theory: Sam commits to the truth of the contents of the proposition that Tom is sad (cf. Uchida 1998).

[13] In my view gar or garu is a suffix rather than a verb.

[14] The status of second person as the other party of an exchange is complex concerning an experiencer of private feelings and is ignored here.

(65) a. Sam to Peter:

Bill wa kana-shii to itta.

'Bill said he is/was sad.'

b. Sam to Peter: *Bill wa kana-shigatte iru to itta.

In (65a) the subject of kana-shii and itta is the same person, Bill. Notice that 'Bill' is third person but kana-shii occurs where kana-shigatte iru should come according to the principle of (64). Why does kana-shii appear there?

Next, let us assume that the person who feels sad is a person other than Sam, the speaker, or Tom, the hearer. Suppose he is Gen.

(66) Sam to Peter:

a. Bill wa Gen ga kana-shigatte iru to itta.

'Bill said Gen is/was sad.'

b. *Bill wa Gen ga kana-shii to itta.

In the context of (66), we can explain straightforwardly that kana-shigatte iru occurs since Gen is third person, but what about the case of (67), where it is the speaker himself, Sam, who is 'sad'?

(67) Sam to Peter:

a. Bill wa watashi (=Sam) ga kana-shigatte iru to itta.

'Bill said I am/was sad.'

b. *Bill wa watashi ga kana-shii to itta.

Here, the first person, watashi (=I) occurs with kana-shigatte iru, which seems counter to the constraint of (64).

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(66) Sam to Peter:

a. Bill wa Gen ga kana-shigatte iru to itta.

‘Bill said Gen is/was sad.’

b. *Bill wa Gen ga kana-shii to itta.

In the context of (66), we can explain straightforwardly that kana-shigatte iru occurs since Gen is third person, but what about the case of (67), where it is the speaker himself, Sam, who is ‘sad’?

(67) Sam to Peter:

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Here, the first person, watashi (=I) occurs with kana-shigatte iru, which seems counter to the constraint of (64).

Let us more closely examine ‘Bill’ in (65a) and watashi in (67a). In (65a)

Bill is supposed to express his own sadness. That is, Bill is the direct source of his feeling and Sam, the speaker, tells Peter what Sam heard from Bill. In (67a), on the other hand, we see watashi, the first person, on the surface behaving as a third person since this watashi is followed by kana-shigatte iru. We will return to this point later.

Desiderative predicates

Such phenomena that are sensitive to the original state of affairs can also be seen in the behavior of other private predicates in Japanese that express the desires of the subjects. Consider the examples in (68) and (69) (cf. Uchida 2011, 182–187).

(68) a. Sam:

Watashi wa Jill to kekkon shi-tai.

'I want to marry Jill.'

b. Sam: *Watashi wa Jill to kekkon shi-tagatteiru.

(69) a. Sam:

Tom wa Jill to kekkon shi-tagatteiru.

'Tom wants to marry Jill.'

b. Sam: *Tom wa Jill to kekkon shi-tai.

Kekkon here is the stem of the verb kekkon suru (=marry) and the utterances of (68) show that 'want' in English can be expressed in two ways, with a suffix -tai or -tagatteiru, in Japanese but the choice seems to be subject to some 'principle.' The simplest picture is that -tai appears when the subject of the verb is first person as in (68a), and -tagatteiru occurs with third person subjects, as in (69a). That is, in (68a) it is Sam, the speaker, who wants to marry Jill. In (69a), on the other hand, Tom, in the third person, is the one who wants to marry Jill. These linguistic facts can be represented in (70a) and (70b) respectively.

(70) a. [Sam says [Sam wants to marry Jill]]

b. [Sam says [Tom wants to marry Jill]]

However, the whole picture is not so simple. In (71), for example, Bill is third person but co-occurs with -tai, and in (72) -tagatteiru is appropriate even if the subject is first person.

(71) a. Sam to Peter:

Bill wa Jill to kekkon shi-tai to itta.

'Bill said he wants to marry Jill.'

b. Sam to Peter: *Bill wa Jill to kekkon shi-tagatteiru to itta.

(72) a. Sam to Peter:

Bill wa watashi (=Sam) ga Jill to kekkon shi-tagatteiru to itta.

'Bill said I want /wanted to marry Jill.'

b. Sam to Peter: *Bill wa watashi ga Jill to kekkon shi-tai to itta.

We can describe the metarepresentations of (71a) and (72a) as in (73a) and (73b) respectively:

(73) a. [Sam says [Bill said [Bill wants to marry Jill]]]

b. [Sam says [Bill said [Sam wants to marry Jill]]]

It is clear that in (73a) the person who wants to marry Jill and the person who utters that fact are the same person, Bill, and that in (73b), on the other hand, the person who wants to marry Jill is different from the man who reported that Sam wants to marry Jill. These behaviors are parallel to those of private predicates.

In the two subsections above we have discussed those phenomena that are sensitive to the original state of affairs concerning private and desiderative predicates. If someone wants to express someone else's feelings or desires, they have to report them based on what they heard from the direct source of information. In Japanese we have linguistic devices such as inflections of verbs or adjectives, in which direct or indirect information is explicitly realized. In English, on the other hand, there are no equivalent linguistic devices such as (kana)-shii / (kana) shi-gatte iru or -tai / -tagatte iru. Rather, a single form of 'be sad' or 'want' appears instead. We cannot trace back to the original state of affairs of the feelings or desires solely from linguistic information.

Just as word order is clearly a syntactic matter, 'inflected metarepresentation' as seen in the present paper also seems syntactic – but is it?

Let us sum up what has been discussed in Section 3 as follows:

(74) a. Sam to Tom: Bill said I(=Sam)'m sad *-shii/-shigatte iru to itta. (cf. [67])

b. [Sam says [Bill said [Sam is sad]]]

(75) a. Sam to Tom: Bill said he wants to marry Jill -shi-tai/*-tagatte iru to itta. (cf. [71a])

b. [Sam says [Bill said [Bill wants to marry Jill]]]

These behaviors of (kana)-shii/(kana)-shigatte iru and (shi)-tai/(shi)-tagatte iru can be pragmatically explained in the following way: in (74a), the first person 'I' behaves like a third person since it is followed by (kana)-shigatte iru instead of (kana)-shii, while in (75a), 'he' is a third person, but it behaves like the first person since (shi)-tai, not (shi)-tagatte iru, follows the subject. I'd like to call this first person in (74a) a 'covert third person' and the third person in (75a) a 'covert first person.'

Let us more closely examine 'Bill' in (65a) and watashi in (67a). In (65a) Bill is supposed to express his own sadness. That is, Bill is the direct source of his feeling and Sam, the speaker, tells Peter what Sam heard from Bill. In (67a), on the other hand, we see watashi, the first person, on the surface behaving as a third person.' We could say that 'I' in (74a) and 'he' in (75a) are syntactically

first person and third person respectively, but pragmatically, third person and first person. We may call this linguistic phenomenon 'fake' person.[15] This is a phenomenon similar to agreement of tense in English as seen in 'was' in 'Mary said Jill was sick in bed.' 'Was' here could be interpreted as 'present' and be called 'covert present.'

In view of evidentiality, inner feeling, desire, thought, perception and so on can only be conveyed by the person concerned and those conveyed from other persons are treated as indirect evidence.[16] Therefore, kana-shii or shi-tai appears when the subject regards the information as something that she/he knows or feels, and kana-shigatte iru or shi-tagatte iru is found when the subject obtains the information through someone else.

4. Concluding remarks

We have shown in the present paper that in Japanese some types of metarepresentational information must be overtly reflected by higher-level explicatures such as verbs indicating speech acts, speech act particles, and suffixes, while in English, they can be left implicit.

The metarepresentational approach advocated here has been developed from the concept of higher-level explicatures in relevance theory by Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995) and is closely connected with cognitive aspects of language as their subtitle Interpretation and Cognition implies. Metarepresentational phenomena, as we have discussed, cover both linguistic affairs and cognitive information on how utterances are processed. Metarepresentation is inherently cognitive-oriented.

Generally speaking, comparative studies on languages tend to focus on the differences in linguistic forms or meaning between target languages, without paying particular attention to the cognitive side of interpretation. The cognitive processing of linguistic information by humans is supposed to be more or less the same in nature; what differs is linguistic realization in each language. In this sense, the metarepresentational perspective reveals vast potential in the field of comparative linguistics. Uchida and Noh (2018) share this view and demonstrate that Japanese and Korean behave very similarly in that the speech act side of higher-level explicatures tends to be linguistically realized in both languages.[17]

We suggested above that the alternation of (kana)-shii/(kana)-shigatte iru or (shi)-tai/(shi)-tagatte iru depends on pragmatic factors such as direct/indirect evidence and furthermore, that this conclusion can be applied to other languages where information on higher-level explicatures or metarepresentations is

[15] I borrowed the term 'fake' from 'fake past' in Nishiguchi (2006). See also Uchida (2013, 90–93).
[16] See Uchida (2022) for a cognitive pragmatic approach to evidentiality
[17] The paper also suggests that the reason for that might be that they have the same SOV word order, while English is an SVO language.

basically explicit as in Japanese and Korean or implicit as in English. We hope that the metarepresentational approach we have presented here will encourage further comparative linguistic studies.

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