

## **FRAMING AND MANIPULATION OF PERSON DEIXIS IN HOSNI MUBARAK'S LAST THREE SPEECHES: A COGNITIVE-PRAGMATIC APPROACH<sup>1</sup>**

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### **Abstract**

The “Arab Spring,” as the revolutions in some Arab countries were called by the international media, was triggered by the “Jasmine Revolt” in Tunisia, which provoked a domino effect to some Arab leaders, starting from Tunisia and spreading to Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, etc. Using the insights of cognitive-pragmatics, the current article shows how the last three speeches of Hosni Mubarak, the demised president of Egypt (DPE), framed the revolution in Egypt and filled person deixis. In particular, the article argues that, from the antepenultimate to the ultimate speech, the DPE, unlike his Tunisian counterpart, made little change to the initial framing of the revolution in Egypt as a strategy to maintain the sociopolitical situation as it was. As transpires from the lexical items environing person deixis, the DPE filled it with cognitive content which prevented him from coming any closer to a pragmatic rapprochement to the Egyptian people.

**Keywords:** Framing; person deixis; Communalism; Manipulation; Cognitive filling.

### **Introduction**

The political situation in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA area) has been volatile for many years now. Even though what happened in Tunisia was framed by the Western media as the “Jasmine Revolution,” the people in the streets called it the “Dignity Revolution,” which was not specific to the Tunisian context. Across most, if not all, the MENA area, people feel affected in their dignity, and humiliated as a result of social, economic, and political conditions engineered and monitored by political mishaps. This obviously cancels the thesis that the West had any direct responsibility for the events that have been happening in the MENA area. To take the question at the

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beginning of his article, “The end of the age of dictators in the Arab world?,” Robert Fisk answered it in the penultimate sentence: “No, on balance, I don't think the age of the Arab dictators is over.” The reason why it is not the end of dictatorship despite revolutions and sacrifice is given by Fisk himself: “We will see to that.”<sup>3</sup> The “WE” stands for the Western governments, who will make sure that dictators will not disappear since the disappearance of them will bring in freedom and democracy for the people under these dictatorships, which will prevent Arab dictators from reigning supreme over the people.

Like its Tunisian counterpart, the Egyptian Revolution was a peaceful resistance to political repression and exclusion. The only weapon the youth had in their possession to resist the regime was the slogans which were engineered with great care. Some of these slogans are listed below:

- “The crescent and the cross against murder and torture”
- “Husni Mubarak, you agent, you sold the gas and (only) the Nile is left (to be sold)”
- “Hit, hit, you Habib, no matter how much you hit, we won't let go”
- “Revolution, revolution, oh Egyptians, so that we can get rid of the traitors”
- “Husni Mubarak, you lazy one, the Egyptian people are not slaves”
- “Oh Gamal, you crow of disunity, take your father and go to Zine
- “Muslims with Christians, we all demand change”
- “Dignity and freedom is the demand of all Egyptians”
- “Liberation, liberation, from the rule of the gang of fraud”
- “Egypt, our country, is not a hospice, for villains and thieves”
- “Police of Egypt, oh police of Egypt, you've become the dogs of the castle”<sup>4</sup>

Since these slogans have been translated from Egyptian Arabic, they have lost their parallelism, alliteration, and rhyming. They target individuals, who are demonized such as Mubarak, his son Gamal, and former Minister of the Interior, Habib Al Adly, and values, which are either praised such as change, dignity, liberation, freedom, etc., or denounced such as fear, cowardice, fraud, cover-up, murder, torture, etc. The “crescent” and the “cross” are obviously metonyms for Islam and Christianity, respectively.

The current article has affinities with a previous publication by the author of the current article (Maalej 2012). Both articles study the last three speeches of the ousted president of Tunisia (OPT) and the DPE. Both articles study person deixis in the last three speeches of the ousted president of Tunisia (OPT) and the DPE. Both articles argue that both presidents failed to recognize after over twenty years of reign that they actually missed the opportunity to be leaders to their people. However, the current article is grounded in cognitive-pragmatics while the previous article is grounded in critical discourse analysis. In terms of the distribution of person deixis, Maalej (2012) comparatively showed interesting differences, which will be addressed in the concluding section. And unlike his Tunisian homologue in the previous article, the DPE did not confess to the Egyptians that he and his people were living on a different

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<sup>3</sup> Robert Fisk, “The brutal truth about Tunisia.” *The Independent*, Monday, 17 January 2011. (<http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/the-brutal-truth-about-tunisia-2186287.html>)

<sup>4</sup> Source: The Angry Arab News Service: A source on politics, war, the Middle East, Arabic poetry, and art. <http://angryarab.blogspot.com/2011/01/egyptian-slogans.html>. I have corrected the slogans that have been mistranslated.

wavelength, but kept orchestrating propaganda as a deceptive framing to manipulate the sociopolitical situation in Egypt in an attempt to maintain power and dominance.

The current article is grounded in cognitive-pragmatics. According to this trend, “pragmatics is concerned with the full complexity of linguistic behaviour. From that perspective, there is no way of addressing, for instance, issues of cognition without taking society and culture into account, nor are there ways of addressing issues of culture abstracted from their cognitive underpinnings and implications” (Verschueren 1999: 7). This is a conception of pragmatics involving the disciplines of sociolinguistics, cognitive linguistics, and anthropology. Linguistic communication relies heavily on cognitive abilities such as perception (especially vision and audition), memory, which includes archived lexical knowledge and world knowledge, and reasoning mechanisms useful for making inferences (such as presuppositions and implicatures). In a cognitive-pragmatic view, language is “a dimension of human mental activity” (Nuyts 2000: 1). Thus, “understanding language means ‘unearthing’ the cognitive infrastructure responsible for producing and perceiving linguistic acts of communication” (Nuyts 2000: 3). The cognitive dimension of linguistic communication is “hidden in the black box of the human mind” while its functional dimension is “part of the observable behavior” (Nuyts 2000: 3).

The structure of this paper is as follows. The first section offers a brief overview of the sociopolitical situation in Egypt before the Revolution, with special emphasis on unemployment, poverty, and illiteracy. The second section addresses framing as a way of misrepresenting reality. The third section offers an overview of person deixis. The fourth section, which is the practical part of the study, offers a detailed analysis of the last three speeches of the DPE, focusing mainly on the concepts of framing and person deixis, with the latter complementing the former. The last section discusses the findings of the article.

## **1. The sociopolitical situation in Egypt prior to January 25, 2011**

The prevailing situation in Egypt before the 25 January 25, 2011, was precarious and volatile socially, economically, and politically. With a population exceeding 80 Millions, rampant unemployment, dire poverty, a high rate of illiteracy, and a ruling party monopolizing both the economic and political life, Egypt was actually prepared to explode. The sociopolitical precedent that produced change in Tunisia was only the last drop that made the glass overflow for Egyptians.

### **1.1. *Unemployment, poverty, and illiteracy***

Socially, “large percentages of its population are young people who are grappling with that joblessness, destitution, and ballooning food prices.” Unemployment brings with it more destitution. Indeed, “nearly half of all Egyptians live under or just above the poverty line, which the World Bank sets at \$2 a day, according to an Associated Press report.” Such a situation was bound to have disastrous effects on the children’s plight. An assessment by the United Nations Children’s Fund, noted that “the situation for

children has deteriorated despite efforts of the government, public institutions, and grass-roots organizations.”<sup>5</sup> However, “unemployment is estimated to be twice the official rate pegged at 10 percent.” This rampant unemployment is basically “self-inflicted.” According to one economist, there are three basic reasons for poverty in Egypt: “People are poor because they cannot produce anything highly valued by others. They can produce things highly valued by others but are hampered or prevented from doing so. Or, they volunteer to be poor.”<sup>6</sup> Most Egyptians are located in the first and second categories, with responsibility for the second category incumbent on the ruling party’s ownership of the country’s economy in conjunction with the armed forces. Regulations are partly responsible for such a situation, which is grimly summed up: “To open a small bakery, our investigators found, would take more than 500 days. To get a legal title to a vacant piece of land would take more than 10 years of dealing with red tape. To do business in Egypt, an aspiring poor entrepreneur would have to deal with 56 government agencies and repetitive government inspections.”<sup>7</sup> On top of unemployment and poverty, Egypt has a total population illiteracy of 71.4% in 2005, with 83% among males and 59.4% among females.<sup>8</sup> Ayman Tawdros, who supervises CARITAS literacy programs in the southern Egyptian governorate Luxor, says that in Egypt “if the children go to school they can’t work, and they are perceived as a financial burden on the family.”<sup>9</sup>

## 1.2. Political life in Egypt

The political situation in Egypt during the reign of the DPE was not any better than its socioeconomic counterpart. It has been characterized by corruption as is summed up in the following excerpt:

Corruption, coercion not to vote, and manipulation of election results occurred during many of the elections over 30 years. Until 2005, Mubarak was the only candidate to run for the presidency, on a yes/no vote. Mubarak won five consecutive presidential elections with a sweeping majority. Opposition groups and international election monitoring agencies accused the elections of being rigged. These agencies have not been allowed to monitor the elections. The only opposing presidential candidate in recent Egyptian history, Ayman Nour, was imprisoned before the 2005 elections. According to a 2007 UN survey, voter turnout was extremely low (around 25%) because of the lack of trust in the corrupt representational system.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Henry J. Reske, “Egypt’s Poverty, Unemployment, Push Youths to Breaking Point.” *Newsmax, Independent American*, Monday, 31 Jan 2011. (<http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/Egypt-poverty-unemployment-unrest/2011/01/31/id/384555>).

<sup>6</sup> Walter Williams, “Egypt’s Self-Inflicted Poverty.” *New American*, Wednesday, 16 February 2011. (<http://thenewamerican.com/opinion/walter-williams/6330-egypts-self-inflicted-poverty>).

<sup>7</sup> Hernando de Soto, “Egypt’s Economic Apartheid: More than 90% of Egyptians hold their property without legal title. No wonder they can’t build wealth and have lost hope.” *The Wall Street Journal*, February 3, 2011.

(<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704358704576118683913032882.html>).

<sup>8</sup> Source: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics\\_of\\_Egypt#Literacy](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Egypt#Literacy)

<sup>9</sup> Cam McGrath, EGYPT: “Population Growth Overtakes Literacy Rise.” *IPS Inter Press Service - North America, Inc* (<http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=50641>).

<sup>10</sup> Source : [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011\\_Egyptian\\_revolution](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Egyptian_revolution)

Politically, elections were counterfeited many a time in Egypt, the last one of which was the November elections 2010 even though the parties of the political opposition were too weak and disconnected to win a substantial vote. The unrecognized Muslim Brotherhood, which has a large representative base among Egyptians, was marginalized and reduced to silence and imprisonment. The outcome of the election created an enmity between the Muslim Brotherhood, the opposition parties, and the rest of the Egyptians, on the one hand, and the National Democratic Party in power, on the other. Between the DPE and the people, there progressively emerged a rift, which was initially caused by the DPE's assassination attempt in Port Said,<sup>11</sup> which encouraged his surroundings to scare him out of seeking closeness with the people. This rift was deeply felt when the DPE started addressing the Egyptians in his speeches in Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) rather than in Egyptian Arabic.

## **2. Framing**

In its history, the concepts of frame and framing have been applied to non-verbal and verbal behaviors. The application of frames to non-verbal behavior was championed by Bateson (2006: 320), who interpreted certain animal behaviors such as “this is play” as frames. For instance, Bateson argues that various forms of aggression, such as biting, produced by animals do not denote actual violence and aggression, but should be interpreted as evoking the frame of “this is play.” Bateson (2006: 323) conceives of this as a psychological frame by analogy to a real picture frame, which says “Attend to what is within and do not attend to what is outside.” Therefore, what serves as filling for the frame constitutes the substance of the frame. On the other hand, Goffman was one of the first researchers to have carried the concept of frame to the verbal realm, claiming that social experience can best be seen in terms of frames. He (1974: 155) defines frames as “principles of organization which govern events – at least social ones – and our subjective involvement in them.” Thus, frames in this sense define, organize, and constrain social experience, knowledge, and communication at large.

Working within the cognitive paradigm, Fillmore (1975: 123-4) brought framing back to the psychological and mental realms, noting that a frame occurs when “certain schemata or frameworks of concepts or terms ... link together as a system, which impose structure or coherence on some aspect of human experience, and which may contain elements which are simultaneously parts of other such frameworks.” A given frame can be invoked for another frame, i.e. used to reframe it. For instance, to serve its own goals and manipulate public opinion both local and international, Israel framed the “Arab Spring” as the “Islamic Winter.” Lakoff (2004: xv) followed suit, arguing with

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<sup>11</sup> According to the BBC, Mubarak has survived six assassination attempts. In June 1995, there was an alleged assassination attempt involving noxious gases and Egyptian Islamic Jihad while he was in Ethiopia for a conference of the Organization of African Unity. Upon return, Mubarak is said to have authorized bombings on Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, which by 1999 saw 20,000 persons placed in detention related to the revolutionary Islamic organizations. He was also reportedly injured by a knife-wielding assailant in Port Said in September 1999.

([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosni\\_Mubarak#Assassination\\_attempts\\_and\\_governing\\_style](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosni_Mubarak#Assassination_attempts_and_governing_style)).

Fillmore that “frames are mental structures that shape the way we see the world. As a result, they shape the goals we seek, the plans we make, the way we act, and what counts as a good or bad outcome of our actions.” Thus, “framing is about getting language that fits your worldview. It is not just language. The ideas are primary – and the language carries those ideas, evokes those ideas” (Lakoff 2004: 4).

Obviously, framing states of affairs is not an innocent operation. Oftentimes, framing constructs social relations that are divisive, conflictive, and antisocial. Lakoff (2004: 100) distinguishes two manipulative frames, namely, spins and propaganda. A spin is “the manipulative use of a frame,” which is “used when something has happened or has been said, and it is an attempt to put an innocent frame on it – that is, to make the embarrassing occurrence sound normal and good.” For instance, calling the extermination of an ethnic group “ethnic cleansing” and an act that increases air pollution the “Clear Skies Act” are cases of spin, whose effect is to euphemistically soften the blow. However, propaganda is a deceptive frame, which is “an attempt to get the public to adopt a frame that is not true and is known not to be true, for the purpose of gaining or maintaining political control” (Lakoff 2004: 100).

A critical investigation of framing exposes the underbelly of power and ideology in language. The concept of framing is a misnomer, which presupposes that categories are not already framed. Framing does not frame categories that are unframed. We do know that every category comes with its own frame. Since such is the case, framing is actually a reframing operation of existing frames. It is used in nearly all areas of knowledge, especially in areas that involve human interaction through language in socioeconomic, sociopolitical, and socio-educational contexts. Since politics is about language, power, and ideology, politicians need to reframe themselves, their opponents, and the events which take place or they create in the best of light in order to serve their own goals. Commenting on the way the events in Egypt during the revolution were dealt with, Bassiouney (2012: 108) reports that “while other media (for example, Aljazeera and the BBC) covered these events in detail, the Egyptian media pretended there were only a few dozen people in Tahrir Square rather than millions,” with the state Egyptian channel “broadcast[ing] cooking programmes.” This is a case of denial of the existence of a revolution owing to the fact that the government owns the mass media which were used to maintain the official version of facts, which indirectly framed about two million people as a handful of young people causing unrest and uproar in Tahrir Square.

### **3. Person deixis**

I believe that the kind of framing adopted for a given state of affairs has a lot to do with the kind of person deixis adopted and the kind of cognitive filling given to them. Person deixis are themselves an important framing device. In linguistics, words are distinguished into content and function words. Content words have lexical content or meaning while function words do not. Person deixis are classified among function words such as articles, prepositions, conjunctions, and auxiliary verbs because they are thought to have no lexical meaning and semantic content. They are also classified among demonstrative pronouns and relative pronouns. In actual fact, person deixis fit

neither in the first nor in the second classifications as will transpire in this sub-section, where they will be shown to have discursive and ideological dimensions.

Person deixis received thorough treatment in pragmatics (Levinson 1983; Hanks 1992, 2005; Marmaridou 2000; Hyland 2002; Harwood 2005) and Critical Discourse Analysis (Kuo 2002, 2003; Íñigo-Mora 2004; Petersoo 2007) in various discourse types. Benvéniste (1966: 251), one of the leading French linguists, argues that the label of “personal pronouns” does not apply to all the pronouns. Indeed, the quality of person is only “proper to I and YOU” (and obviously WE) while all the other pronouns (HE, SHE, THEY)<sup>12</sup> may apply to humans and to non-humans. Indeed, across languages and cultures only the speaker can use I, WE, and YOU. Since animals and objects obviously cannot speak, the pronouns I, WE, and YOU remain the only person deixis used by the addresser about his/her individuality and that of the addressee. Unlike nouns which constantly refer to the same object, “each *I* has its own reference, and corresponds each time to a unique entity” (Benvéniste 1966: 252). The same holds for YOU and WE. Benvéniste (1966: 254) argues that at the enunciation level of discourse person pronouns serve the problem of “inter-subjective communication,” which “language has resolved by creating an ensemble of non-referential ‘empty’ signs always available vis-à-vis ‘reality’ and get ‘filled’ as soon as a speaker uses them in discourse.”

Apart from their discursive use, pronouns have been shown to have an important ideological dimension. Basing his stand on “language use as productive of, as well as reflective of social relations,” Pennycook (1994: 178) argues that the use of pronouns “opens up a whole series of questions about language, power, and representation.” He (1994: 174-5) calls this dimension the “politics of the pronoun,” whereby “pronouns are deeply embedded in naming people and groups, and are thus always political in the sense that they always imply relations of power.” To illustrate this, Pennycook (1994: 177-78) argues that “of all the pronouns, perhaps ‘I’ seems the most innocent, referencing, so it seems, an incontestable self. And yet, here too, there are some questions to be asked. First, ‘I’ can also operate as one half of a construction of the Other: It can stand in opposition to any ‘you’ or ‘they’ in the same way that ‘we’ does.”

While the user of “I” is anchored in discourse as egocentric and self-centered, “WE” constructs two different social relations. Pennycook (1994: 175) argues that “‘we’ is always simultaneously inclusive and exclusive, a pronoun of solidarity and of rejection, of inclusion and exclusion. On the one hand it defines a ‘we’, and on the other it defines a ‘you’ or a ‘they.’” With particular interest to this article is what Pennycook said about the overt or covert dualities that WE constructs in discourse. According to him (1994: 176), “if ‘we’ claims authority and communality, it also constructs a ‘we/you’ or a ‘we/they’ dichotomy. Thus, these two pronouns must always be understood with reference to other assumptions about who is being defined as the ‘we’ from which the ‘you’ and the ‘they’ differ.” However, Pennycook (1994: 176) argues that “when a more overt choice is made to name a ‘we’ (self) and a ‘they’ (other), other dangerous divides occur along many different lines.” He also (1994: 176-77) argues that “both ‘you’ and ‘they’ thus frequently operate as the signifier of an assumed Other whose naming, whether as an explicit othering or as an implicit assumption of

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<sup>12</sup> To distinguish them from other uses of pronouns in this article, the person deixis under study will be written in uppercase.

difference, is always a question of cultural politics, of how people come to represent themselves and others.”

The view of person deixis as inseparable from social deixis has been convincingly defended by Marmaridou (2000: 98), who presents it as an Idealized Cognitive Model of “pointing out,” which is “based on an existential presupposition of an entity in space and on the speaker’s intention to direct the hearer’s attention to it.” Marmaridou (2000: 99) argues that deixis is “a grammatical category which reveals our conceptualization of human beings as objects in space and of human language as an object in time,” with the speaker as the center of this conceptualization. Social deixis provides anchorage for language in its immediate interactional context of use. The social roles of participants determine whether, for instance, “we” is inclusive or exclusive, which strongly suggests that person deixis is closely tied to social deixis.

Another important view of deixis is offered by Hanks (2005), who holds a conception of language as communicative practices where deixis plays a pragmatic role in social interaction in discourse. He (2005: 191) calls deictic expressions “communicative resources.” In face-to-face language use, people do know well those who are interacting with them at a point *t* in time. In this sense, different people will use the same pronouns as shifters, i.e. each time there is a new speaker the pronoun shifts in order to accommodate the personality of the speaker. For Hanks (2005: 197), there is no egocentric use of deixis since this contradicts the interaction-centricity of speech. For that, “in the deictic field we are dealing with the actual occupancy of the positions” (Hanks 2005: 210-11), whereby “deictic reference is a social engagement emergent in practice.” Hanks (1992: 53) argues that “given that acts of reference are interactively accomplished, a sociocentric approach is certain to be more productive than an egocentric one, even when the speaker is the primary ground of reference.”

Political speeches stand out in terms of the use of person deixis, whereby one speaker will constantly refer to the self as “I” and will be filling other deictic pronouns with different social roles. In this case, pronouns are not so much shifters as frames being individuated and filled by their user, the deictic center. The kind of political speeches under study anchor the speaker in discourse as a one-sided participant, with no interlocutors in the immediate indexical field. Clearly, political speeches as delivered by presidents do not exemplify sociocentricity but egocentricity. Studies of deixis in political discourse abound. I have selected four case studies from different regions of the world to show the pervasiveness of deixis in political discourse world-wide and the different foci adopted. Working with WE in political debates in the Belgian context from the systemic-functional linguistic perspective, Vertommen (2013: 365), for instance, argues that WE serves “the speaker’s assessment of (aspects of) their status in terms of necessity and/or feasibility.” Adopting a socio-pragmatic perspective on YOU in debates among Taiwanese politicians, Kuo (2002: 29) notes that the “different uses of *ni* ... signal that the interactive goal of the debate has changed from establishing or reinforcing solidarity with the audience to expressing antagonism and confrontation vis-à-vis one’s opponent. Analyzing Cuba’s Castro’s use of inclusive and exclusive WE, O’Connor et al (2008: 123) found that Castro makes use of three types of WE: Personal WE, which stands for Castro only; collective WE, which refers to the Cuban people, nation, or government; and ordinary WE, which stands for Castro plus specific individuals. Working in an African political context, Adetunji (2006: 188) notes that inclusive WE “has been deliberately employed by the speaker to convince and probably



manipulate the audience to reason like him and help him in sharing the load of responsibility.” Thus, the pronoun WE serves to frame politicians and the individuals they select to fill the frame with in terms of sociopolitical solidarity and closeness. Those who are left out of the frame are framed in terms of sociopolitical confrontation and remoteness.

#### 4. Case study

The case study at hand consists in analyzing the last three speeches of Husni Mubarak from the perspective of framing and use of person deixis. The corpus of the three speeches is very small, counting 4331 words, with 1266 words going to the antepenultimate speech, 1113 to the penultimate speech, and 1952 to the ultimate speech. All the speeches have been delivered in Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) to viewers all over the world through satellite TV. Commenting on the use of the Tunisian dialect of Arabic by the ousted president of Tunisia for the first and last time in his life as a president of Tunisia, a journalist said that “Mr. Mubarak, by contrast, went for a gravelly and grave speech in MSA. His predecessor, Gamal Abdel Nasser, was known for using Egyptian colloquial in speeches, but Mr. Mubarak was having none of it last night. Perhaps he felt like Mr. Ben Ali’s last move looked desperate.”<sup>13</sup> If the choice of MSA made translation easier for the author of the current article, MSA was one of the factors that may have distanced the DPE from the Egyptians because it is not the language of the people.

The translation of the speeches into English for this research actually preserved the pronoun system intact. MSA is a pro-drop language, allowing for pronouns to disappear from the surface of discourse, which is compensated by their recoverability from verb morphology via cliticized person morphemes prefixed to the beginning of the verb. Since English is not a pro-drop language, the pronouns are bound to appear on the surface of discourse. For instance, in *sa-ʔu-Hasib-u illađina ʔajrsamu* ([I] will make accountable those who committed crimes), the sentence has no overt first person speaker pronoun, because *ʔu* is actually the first person clitic in MSA. Thus, working with the translation ensured the appearance of person deixis on the surface. I was also very careful to keep agency in the passive sentences as overt as in the Arabic text in order not to lose the import of items that could have a statistical import for the analysis of the speeches. For instance, although the use of the passive is more frequent in English than in Arabic, I used it sparingly in the translation so that it would not interfere with the pronoun system in use. If in some places the speeches may sound awkward in English, awkwardness may be a result of this strategy of methodological soundness. Furthermore, since the translation was made from audio material, the author made his best to divide the speeches into coherent sentences and paragraphs.

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<sup>13</sup> Johnson Language, “Egypt: Mubarak speech,” *The Economist*, January 29, 2011. (<http://www.economist.com/blogs/johnson/2011/01/egypt>).

#### 4.1. *The antepenultimate speech*

The antepenultimate speech was given on January 28, 2011, four days after protests erupted across Egypt, occasioning confrontation between the riot police and protestors and claiming some fatalities. The speech crystallizes the DPE's framing of the situation in Egypt to undermine protests in the street, and fills the pronouns "I" and "WE" and their objective and genitive derivatives with cognitive content fit to the DPE's worldview, which will be studied in more detail in the rest of this sub-section.

##### 4.1.1. *Framing of the situation*

The events that marked four days and nights of peaceful protest in Tahrir Square and throughout Egypt demanding the departure of Mubarak and his government, were framed by the DPE as demonstrations. According to the *Concise Oxford English Dictionary* (eleventh edition), a demonstration is "a public meeting or march expressing protest or other opinion on an issue." The problem with such a framing is that it did not match what was happening on the ground. As "a public meeting or march," a demonstration cannot last for five consecutive days and nights. Further down in the speech, the DPE added that "what happened during these demonstrations surpasses the looting, anarchy, and arson to a far-reaching plan to shake up stability and assault legitimacy," which is a covert recognition that the situation was more than a demonstration. The police forces were framed as protectors of the demonstrations and demonstrators "before these demonstrations turn into riots." The facts on the ground did not show the riot police as friendly forces protecting a peaceful demonstration but forces that assaulted and killed in cold blood young people to stifle the movement. In other words, the situation was framed as a demonstration but acted upon and reacted to as the real thing – regime change. The DPE rejected framing the events as "riots" and insisted on framing them as "demonstrations" because they did not yet at the time of the speech "threaten public order and impede the citizen's normal course of daily life." These contradictions make this kind of framing incriminatory and misleading. If public order was not threatened and the normal life of citizens was not jeopardized, how can fatalities be accounted for? The idea of the police forces protecting demonstrators was deceptive, and framing the events as demonstrations when people were literally "living" in Tahrir Square for five days and nights was contrary-to-fact.

On the other hand, the DPE framed his regime as democratic. According to him, the demonstrations were possible owing to "the large margin of freedom of opinion, speech, the press, and other freedoms which were made possible by reform initiatives in favor of the sons of the people." This is perhaps blaming the situation on too much freedom given to Egyptians by the DPE, which is utter demagoguery. For one, Human Rights Watch said that "torture and police abuse under the regime of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak were one of the main causes of the protests that have engulfed the country for more than a week."<sup>14</sup> The very same report called for "immediate legal,

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<sup>14</sup> The report was titled, "Work on Him Until he Confesses: Impunity for Torture in Egypt" was mentioned by Nayla Razzouk, "Torture Under Mubarak Regime Fueled Protests, Rights Group Says." *Bloomberg News*, Feb 1, 2011. (<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-01/torture-under-mubarak-regime-fueled-protests-rights-group-says.html>).

structural, and political reforms to ensure that the judicial system holds perpetrators of torture accountable and deters future abuse,” which shows that the DPE’s talk about “reform initiatives” in this speech is mere propaganda to undermine the protestors’ movement. Egypt was framed by the DPE as “a country of institutions, ruled by the Constitution and the law” although many attempts have been made during his 30-year rule to corrupt the Constitution to suit his purposes and those of his ruling party.

4.1.2. Pronouns I and WE

At the level of person deixis, this speech is characterized by a marked use of “I” and “WE,” with 29 instances for the former and 28 for the latter, whose cognitive filling and functions vary greatly throughout the speech. Another feature of this distribution of “I” and “WE” in the speech is that they alternate in each paragraph as will be shown in Chart (1) below:




Figure (1): I and WE alternation in each paragraph

Although there is no statistical difference between these two pronouns, they are cognitively filled in different ways. If “I” presupposes “YOU” as part of the dialogic dimension of this pair, as we are told by Benvéniste and Pennycook, the use of “I” in this speech has been marked by the presence of one instance of “YOU” which stands or refers to the DPE’s audience in his televised speech: “Brotherly citizens, I talk to YOU in a delicate circumstance.” As the DPE defined them, Egyptians are the citizens of Egypt. In the rest of the speech, “YOU” does not appear anymore. Such a subsequent erasure of YOU may be interpreted as a mystification of the social dimension of deixis in favor of the discursive anchorage of the DPE as an egocentric deictic center. As a

confirmation, “I” was exploited to express his feelings regarding the events (I deeply regretted the death of innocent victims), his determination (I repeatedly emphasized; I am so biased to the freedom of citizens), his promises (I will always stick to my right to practice the freedom of opinion and expression; I will not be negligent in making any decisions; I will defend Egypt’s security and stability and the safety of its people), his threats (I am equally keen to the same degree on preserving Egypt’s security and stability; will not allow for this fear to get hold of our citizens), his mental states (I do know very well the extent of their worries and sufferings; I never was one day disconnected from that), and actions (I work for that daily).

The pronoun “I” was filled in different ways. Pronouns are not simply the grammaticization of persons in discourse; they are, more importantly, recipients of knowledge about how the speaker intends to be seen and thought of. Addressing Egyptians as “brotherly citizens,” the DPE must have considered himself as a brother and fellow citizen to Egyptians in using the first “I” of the speech, which may bring him closer to the people. However, when he said (My instructions to the government ...; I am assuming my first responsibility ...; I will not allow for this fear to get hold of our citizens ...; I have asked the government to tender its resignation today ...; I will assign to the new government ...), the DPE was using what I would call “a presidential-I” by analogy to “Royal I” as is clear from the contents of these clauses. For five paragraphs, the DPE filled the “I” with his presidential status. Evidence for this has come from him when he said at the beginning of paragraph 6: “I am speaking to you not only as the president of the republic but also as an Egyptian.” He wanted to be perceived not only as occupying a higher position on top of the rest of the people, which he felt has decreased his power to persuade them to his version of the truth, but also as an ordinary citizen – a gesture to seek closeness to and communality with them. But this was the only instance where he filled the “I” with his status as an Egyptian citizen, after which he relapsed into the presidential one. Coming from a person that has acquired the skill and experience to be boastful about his achievements, the “I” was so engrossed in egocentricity and haughtiness that the DPE nearly lost pragmatic contact with the masses.

The pronoun “WE” comes massively only at the very end of the speech as is clear in Figure (1) above. Like “I,” “WE” was filled in two different ways even though in both cases it is an inclusive “WE.” In talking about politics and the economic policy, the DPE filled “WE” with himself, the members of his government, and the ruling party. Obviously, this kind of filling excluded the common people, who were neither involved in politics nor even in economic policy. Such a use and filling is emblematic of an undemocratic system, where the people are excluded from decision-making and political activities and an elite decides for them (“Our program to besiege unemployment ...;” “WE will follow it in new steps which emphasize our respect for the independency ...;” “The road to reform which WE have opted for is irrevocable ...;” “WE will protect what WE have realized and build on it and care for the future of our homeland,” “... OUR citizens and for this inquiry to throw its shadows on OUR becoming and future...,” “... and destroy what WE have built ...,” “... when WE knew OUR path and OUR orientation and WE determined the goals WE were striving for...”). Even though the Egyptians have been excluded in these instances, they are presented as the beneficiaries of the programs fulfilled. However, in talking about problems related to suffering and the future of Egypt, the DPE filled “WE” with himself

and the Egyptians as in the following instances (“... OUR youth ...,” “We must beware of many examples that surround US ...,” “... the problems that WE face and the objectives that WE endeavor to reach ...,” “WE surmounted together difficult times before ...,” “... when WE faced them up as one homeland, one people ...,” “It is OUR commitments and objectives that will determine OUR fate and OUR future,” “There is no way in front of US to fulfill them except through ...”). The DPE talked about the youth as OUR youth, i.e. his youth and those of the people or Egypt, which is an emotive use. In other cases, he referred to them many times as “the sons of the people.”

To sum up framing and the implementation of person deixis in this speech, it can be safely stated that the DPE framed the events in Egypt as they were not as an attempt to deny their seriousness and maintain his power over them. In terms of the use of person deixis, his leaning for “I” as against “WE” showed that he was cognitive-pragmatically far from representing closeness with the people.

#### **4.2. *The penultimate speech***

This speech was given on February 2, 2011 when the youth at Tahrir Square were there since January 25, 2011. One day before it, the “opposition movements have declared a nationwide strike and planned to stage a demonstration of a million people in Cairo today to force Mubarak out of office, following seven days of protests. The demonstrations have left more than 100 people dead and roiled international stock, bond and oil markets, with investors concerned that unrest may spread to other countries in the region or lead to the closure of the Suez Canal.<sup>15</sup> Much similar in content to the antepenultimate speech, this speech includes the DPE’s framing of the situation together with a particular use of the pronouns “I” and “WE,” which will be studied in the rest of this sub-section.

##### *4.2.1. Framing of the situation*

This speech includes three targets of framing: The situation in Egypt, participants in the events in Egypt, and the Egyptians. The DPE was perseverant in framing the situation as a demonstration as he did in the previous speech. A demonstration cannot last eight days and nights. The other mismatch between the framing and reality came from the fact that the youth were not there to express a simple “protest or other opinion on an issue.” Rather, they were there for a good cause, and many issues. Thus, framing the situation as “a peaceful demonstration” was a strategy on the part of the DPE to divert attention from the real thing and to belittle the real cause behind it.

From the beginning of the speech, the DPE framed the participants in the events in terms of “Good guys” vs. “Bad guys,” whereby the Egyptian youth and the citizens have been cleft into two: “Noble youth and citizens” vs. “those who endeavored to spread anarchy, resort to violence and confrontation, and leap on and assault

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<sup>15</sup> Nayla Razzouk, “Torture under Mubarak Regime Fueled Protests, Rights Group Says.” *Bloomberg News*, Feb 1, 2011. (<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-01/torture-under-mubarak-regime-fueled-protests-rights-group-says.html>).

constitutional legitimacy.” The good guys are framed as duped victims of exploitation by the bad guys, which is insulting for the intelligence of the good guys. The bad guys have been identified with their bad deeds but have not been named. The DPE mentioned a double exploitation of the two sides. The former were exploited by the latter, and the latter were exploited by “political forces,” which encouraged escalation and incitement. The description of the acts committed framed the bad guys as less than thugs, thus demonizing them.

The last item framed in this speech is the Egyptians themselves, who were framed as being helpless and scared of the situation. This framing is manipulative and deceptive, geared towards mounting Egyptians against the youth in Tahrir Square. First, the message from Tunisia may have given the youth self-confidence that what happened there could be replicated in Egypt. Psychologically, the youth put fear, so to speak, behind them as a lesson from the Tunisian “Jasmine Revolt.” Second, hundreds of youth in the Square were killed between the antepenultimate speech and the penultimate speech. Unarmed and peaceful, the youth were in the streets challenging the weaponry of the regime, which is certainly not fear. Third, as in many testimonies, the youth in the Square received enough psychological support from parents, relatives, and friends through cell phones, which may have given them more self-confidence and determination to carry on their peaceful revolution. Fourth, like their Tunisian counterparts, the Egyptian youth had really nothing to fear for as they had nothing to lose and everything to gain. Most of them were unemployed (graduates of higher education) or students having no hope to be employed in the near future.

#### 4.2.2. *Pronouns I and WE*

Although the count of pronouns in this speech dropped by at least one-third compared to those in the antepenultimate speech, the number of “I” instances is slightly higher. The speech counts 31 occurrences of “I” versus only 9 for “WE”. This imbalance between “I” and “WE” suggests a clear persistence on the part of the DPE to stick to individualism, egocentrism, and self-centeredness.

All the “I” instances were “presidential-I,” i.e. were filled with the personality of the president. As in the first speech, the DPE started his speech with “I talk to YOU,” where “I” was obvious but the “YOU” was not until he said: “I direct my talk today directly to the sons of the people.” This is a form of dialogue, where the DPE anchors the self in discourse and designates “the sons of the people” as his interlocutors. Since the pronoun “I” enables its user to appropriate discourse, the DPE devoted his speech to talking about his political duties and responsibilities, his commitments, and some of his achievements. All of them are aimed at recruiting confidence and solidarity from the Egyptians to his person.


In a rather boring fashion, the DPE told the people about his political duties in order to show them that he cared for them (“My first responsibility now is to recover the security ...,” “I call on both houses of Parliament to discuss the amendment ...,” “I will follow up on the assignments of the new government ...,” “I assign the police to perform its role ...”). The DPE also committed himself to three important promises: That he would work toward a smooth transfer of power, that he did not intend to run for president again, and that he would not leave the country as his Tunisian counterpart did

(“I say in clear expressions that I will work during the months left of my current term ...;” “I say earnestly and notwithstanding the current circumstance that I did not intend to run as a candidate ...;” “On its soil, I will die”). In pledging these things, the DPE was making concessions to Egyptians owing to his feeling that the balance of power was beginning to change in the streets. The DPE also told Egyptians about his achievements in order to build confidence for himself (“I am also a man of the sons of our armed forces ...;” “I have spent enough time in my life at the service of Egypt ...;” “... what I have rendered to the homeland in times of war and peace ...;” “I am now very keen on putting an end to my service ...;” “I have never been a seeker of power or authority ...”). In delving into talking about responsibilities, commitments, and achievements, the DPE was deeply anchored in discourse which enabled him to forget about the Egyptians’ concerns and worries. Significantly, for four paragraphs (from the third to the sixth) the only pronoun that was used was the first person singular.

Although “WE” is infrequent compared to “I” in this speech, the second paragraph received most of its occurrences (6 out of 9). This is an emotional paragraph, in which “WE” was filled with the DPE as a human being having feelings and emotions and the Egyptians. “WE” was used inclusively, whereby the DPE fuses with Egyptians in sympathy for the killing of their children in the demonstrations. The paragraph started with, “We have been living together painful days,” through which he meant to create togetherness, communality, and solidarity with Egyptians. The inclusive “WE” also enabled him to include Egyptians with him in the responsibility for the events when he said: “The events of the last few days impose on us all – people and leadership – the choice between anarchy and stability and set in front of us new conditions and a different Egyptian reality.” The “US” is slightly varied in filling from the previous “WE” since he included the “leadership” with the people. Leadership does not stand solely for the personality of the president but also his government and party. Thus, when it came to political responsibilities, achievements, and commitments, the DPE used “I.” When it came to the moral responsibility for the outcome of the situation, Egyptians were included with the leadership. “OUR” in “our people” cannot be inclusive of the people because of possession. Most likely, “OUR” here is a royal-WE. On the other hand, “our armed forces” is ambiguous. Knowing that he wanted to use the armed forces against the people, it may be argued that this is another royal-WE here. If this reading is correct, he is excluding the people and including the members of the government under leadership in a previous example.

The other three instances of “WE” occur in the last paragraph, and they have the same function as in the second one: An emotional one. There is another occurrence of “our people,” which is most likely a royal-WE, positing the DPE as haughty and condescending. Using the possessive “OUR” before “people” sounds a bizarre way of talking about human beings as in times of slavery. Another “WE” occurs in: “History will judge me and the others for what we have done,” which is inclusive of the leadership, i.e. the DPE, his government, and the ruling party. And history has indeed judged them for what they have not achieved for Egypt and the Egyptians. The last “WE” in this paragraph is ambiguous between two readings: A royal-WE and an inclusive “WE,” filled with the DPE, his government, and the ruling party. This “WE” cannot be inclusive of the Egyptians or the people because the DPE was talking about a peaceful transfer of power in the hands of the sons of the people: “Its flag and

faithfulness will shift within the hands of its sons.” The distribution of “I” and “WE” in the penultimate speech discussed above is shown in Figure (2) below:



**Figure (2): Dominance of “I” in the speech**

To sum up this speech, the farming of the situation persisted as a demonstration and the participants in it are framed as “bad guys” who overpowered the “good guys”, with the Egyptians standing fearful in between. At the level of the pronoun system, the frequency of “WE” has gone down, with the result that the DPE was not able to detach himself from his own egocentricity to socially reconcile with the Egyptians.

#### **4.3. The ultimate speech**

This ultimate speech was given on February 10, 2011, eight days after the penultimate one and one day before the DPE resigned as a president of Egypt. It marks a departure from the other two speeches in terms of length, framing, quality and quantity of pronouns, speech act verbs, and the metaphors used.

##### *4.3.1. Framing of the situation*

In this speech, the DPE took the framing of the events in Egypt a step further than “demonstrations.” Alternately, he framed the events as a “crisis,” “critical times,” “a critical moment,” and “difficult current crossroad.” The *Concise Oxford English Dictionary* gives the following designation for crisis: “A time of intense difficulty and



danger.” However, “crisis” itself comes from a medical metaphor, which is “the turning point of a disease when an important change takes place, indicating either recovery or death.” In drawing on the medical field, this framing entails that it needs a solution but does not raise the question of political or moral responsibility for it. In framing the situation as such, the DPE showed more readiness to accept change otherwise Egypt would be in serious difficulty. The DPE acknowledged in praising the youth for not only dreaming about the future but more importantly making it, which frames the situation as a “change”: “I am proud of you as symbols for a new generation of Egyptians who is calling for change to the better and sticking to it, and dreaming of the future and making it.” The DPE also legitimized this change by dubbing it as a movement for change: “This commitment springs from a sure conviction of the honest purity of your intentions and movements, and your demands are just and legitimate.” The DPE understood or feigned to understand that what the Egyptians were calling for was “a peaceful transfer of power,” which he would help to achieve by the end of his electoral term. He also recognized the opposition as also calling for change: “Egypt’s youth who led the call for change and all the other political forces.”

There is an interesting framing of Egypt, the youth, and the DPE in this speech in terms of the kinship system. The linguistic metaphors used are the following:

Brotherly citizens and sons, male and female youth of Egypt  
 ... a talk of the father to his sons and daughters ...  
 Sons, the youth of Egypt, brotherly citizens ...  
 ... the demands of its sons (Egypt’s sons) ...  
 ... martyrs from among the sons of Egypt ...  
 ... relates to Egypt with regard to its present and the future of its sons ...  
 It will stand on its feet anew owing to the sincerity and faithfulness of its sons, all its children  
 ... the demands of the sons of the homeland ...  
 It will remain in the heart of the elderly, the youth, and the children, be they Muslims or Copts, and in the minds and consciences of our sons ...


All the foregoing expressions include a kinship term (brother, son, daughter, father), which the DPE used to address or refer to himself, the youth, Egypt, and the homeland. Abu-Abbas et al (2010: 1) studied the metaphoric use of the kinship system among non-relatives in Jordanian Arabic, which they called “fictive kinship names,” and found that people use them to promote solidarity, respect, and emotiveness. In Maalej (2010: 155-56), I argued that kinship terms of address in Tunisian Arabic can be used metaphorically among members of the extended family (grandparents, uncle, and aunt) and the children of a nuclear family (nephew or niece), and can be extended to non-acquaintances. Using a cognitive-pragmatic perspective, Maalej found that this way of addressing non-acquaintances creates familiarity and minimizes distance between addresser and addressee, manipulating the CENTER-PERIPHERY image schema to bring the addressee closer to addresser, thus enhancing persuasiveness among non-acquaintances. This persuasive dimension was also acknowledged in a previous publication by Maalej (2007).

The system of kinship is used to metaphorically frame Egypt and Egyptians. According to this framing, A HOMELAND IS A PARENT and THE YOUTH ARE

THE SONS OF THE HOMELAND, whereby Egypt is the parent and Egyptians are its children. Such a framing has the effect of persuading Egyptians not to harm Egypt through their deeds by calling for dialogue. On the other hand, the DPE also framed himself metaphorically when he said about his speech, “a talk of the father to his sons and daughters.” This suggests the conceptual metaphor, A PRESIDENT IS A FATHER OF THE YOUTH. This double framing of the Egyptians as the sons of the DPE and Egypt creates an emotive blend between EGYPT and PRESIDENT, where Egypt is the mother and the DPE the father, which establishes a close link between the DPE and Egypt. He said about it: “It will remain a dear country that will not leave me and that I will not leave before I am buried.” Although this is meant for those who expected to see him leave the country as the ousted president of Tunisia did, it is a parody reminiscent of the marriage liturgy: “Till Death Do Us Part.

#### 4.3.2. Pronouns

The dominance of the pronoun “I” in this speech does not need demonstrating. The DPE is again self-centered, and gives an autobiography. His intention is manifold: Arouse the emotions of pity and sympathy in the citizens, anchors himself in discourse by enumerating his achievements, and exercise his powers as a president. The analysis will focus mainly on paragraphs 1, 2, 5, 6, and 7 owing to the distribution of person deixis shown in the following chart:



**Figure (3): Wavering use of pronouns in the ultimate speech**

By far, the most important change that the speech introduced is the overt use of “YOU” in the first paragraph along with “I” in a statistically striking way. There occurred either “I” or “YOU” every 10.9 words, which were used 34 times in the first

paragraph. In the other two speeches, when “I” was used it was hardly ever accompanied by overt “YOU.” “YOU” is filled from the beginning of the speech with “the youth of Egypt in Tahrir Square and those on its extensive soil.” It is significant that the youth was singled out in his speech (“I address myself to you all”). This is discursively clear when he framed his speech as a “talk from the bottom of my heart – a talk of the father to his sons and daughters.” For the first time in three speeches, there is talk about dialogue between the DPE and the youth. In the previous speeches, the youth were talked ABOUT and not in the most favorable fashion; in this speech, they are talked TO. The DPE talked to the youth overtly (“I address myself today to the youth of Egypt,” “I address myself to you,” “I tell you,” which is repeated four times). He talked to them to tell them how proud he was of them (“I am proud of you”), to assure them (“I assure you”), to tell them that he felt the same as they did (“My heart was as much pained as yours”), and to tell them that he understands them (“your voices,” “your messages,” “your demands,” and “your intentions and movements”). The use of YOU by the DPE with the youth anchors them for the first time in the discourse of the speech as a viable interlocutor with a personality of their own. As Benvéniste rightly claimed, “I” and “YOU” are the only personal pronouns that are associated with personhood. Even if “I” remains the deictic center, “YOU” is its interface and it only exists by it.

Having anchored the youth as his interlocutors through the pronoun “YOU” right from the first paragraph, the DPE reinstated himself as a deictic center in the second paragraph without overt mention of “YOU.” However, in this paragraph, the “I” is not felt as too egocentric or condescending. Actually, most of what the DPE said was presented as for the benefit of “YOU.” The DPE offered the youth a series of commissives (“I will not stand as a candidate in the next presidential elections,” “... going forward with my responsibility to protect the Constitution and the people’s interests,” “I will keep it till we reach the safety shore with Egypt and its people”) and a series of commitments or achievements (“I declared in uncontroversial and straightforward terms,” “I declared my adherence to that,” “I declared a similar adherence in degree to going forward with my responsibility,” “This is the oath that I swore before God and the homeland,” “I proposed a specific vision to weather away the current crisis”). The purpose of these is to show the youth that the DPE is using his power as a president to serve the country, i.e. he is not abusing power since he was working toward “a peaceful transfer of power.”

In the fifth paragraph, “WE” and its objective and genitive derivatives occupy discourse. Their filling is fairly ambiguous. When the DPE talked about confidence in “our economy, in our international self-image,” it is not self-evident what is included inside “OUR” here. To disambiguate the situation, two questions need to be asked: Do Egyptians own their economy? Who is interested in Egypt’s international self-image? The answer to the first question is negative: “the government largely failed to equitably share the wealth, and the benefits of growth have failed to trickle down to improve economic conditions for the broader population, especially with the growing problem of unemployment and underemployment among youth under the age of 30 years.”<sup>16</sup> The answer to the second question is definitely not the Egyptians, i.e. the rank-and-file. The self-image of Egypt as a tourist resort is only of interest to the lords of the tourist

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<sup>16</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy\\_of\\_Egypt](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Egypt)

industry in Sharm Al-Sheikh resort. So these two uses of “WE” seem to be cynical and outrageous, and do not include the Egyptians.

The framing of the situation in terms of “difficult times” allows the DPE to mention that these “have made us and our economy suffer damage and loss daily.” Again, laying responsibility on the “difficult times” for the sufferance on “US” here cannot include Egyptians because they have always been living in difficult times. “US” definitely includes businessmen affiliated to the president, his government, and his ruling party members as the wealthiest entrepreneurs and owners of Egypt. The events have certainly affected their pockets, with strikes, sit-ins, and the Stock Exchange on the brink of collapse. Another couple of “We” occurred in: “We should continue the national dialogue which we have started in a team spirit.” These are filled with the members of the committee designated by the DPE to hold a dialogue with the opposition and some of the opposition members who accepted to talk with the committee, with the youth in Tahrir Square categorically refusing this dialogue which they felt was meant to dilute their movement into unilateral agreements that did not represent them. There is a last “WE,” which was a royal-WE when the DPE referred to “our citizens.” Thus, all the occurrences of “WE” in this paragraph are exclusive of Egyptians.

The sixth paragraph is an I-dominated one. Although it is much similar in terms of the pronoun “I” count to the first paragraph, it departs from it by including one “WE” instance only. The frequency of occurrence of the pronouns “I,” “WE,” and “YOU” in the whole speech is one pronoun every 18.76 words while the frequency of “I” is one every 32 words. This paragraph has exceeded both the frequency of pronouns at the level of the speech and that of “I” in it, with one “I” every 13 words. Thus, it is self-centered; it is a personal tale about the DPE’s beginnings at the army up to the time of the speech. Perhaps the only unselfish event that he talked about was the fact that he nominated a deputy president of the republic. The DPE’s heroic deeds dominate the paragraph, which nobody can verify and which implicitly smell of insinuation to the youth about their lack of devotion, loyalty, and sacrifice to the homeland. At one point, the DPE was so indulging that he fell into deception. In a series of I-statements, he said:

In no day did I submit to foreign pressures or dictations.  
I preserved peace.  
I worked for the security and stability of Egypt.  
I endeavored to work for its renaissance for the sake of its children.  
I never one day looked for power or fake popularity.

Lakoff (2004: 3) said that each word comes with its own frame, and even if the frame is denied or negated, it is still evoked by people. Because Egyptians and non-Egyptians know what the DPE did for three decades to Egypt not for Egypt, they know that he was misrepresenting reality in his speech. Galasinski (2000: 36) defines misrepresentation as “information manipulation.” Lakoff (2004: 100) calls this “propaganda,” which is a deceptive frame “to get the public to adopt a frame that is not true and is known not to be true, for the purpose of gaining or maintaining political control.” Van Dijk (2006: 360) argues that manipulation “not only involves power, but specifically *abuse* of power, that is, *domination*. That is, manipulation implies the exercise of a form of *illegitimate* influence by means of discourse: Manipulators make others believe or do things that are in the interest of the manipulator, and against the

best interests of the manipulated.” It is precisely through non-facts and rumors that the DPE was for long polishing his career as a heroic one. For instance, Egyptians do know that the DPE’s regime was US-backed, and that he used to take his orders from Americans especially concerning matters related to Israel and its relations with the Palestinian Authority. Egyptians also do know that the DPE not only was not indifferent to power (spending 6 terms in office), but also wanted power to remain in the family.

In the seventh paragraph, the DPE anchors himself in discourse through a self-confident “I,” and eulogizes Egyptians through an inclusive “WE” (“We Egyptians”), capitalizing on a rather imagined kind of brand new and unheard of communality he created with Egyptians. No sooner did the DPE include all Egyptians in this filling than he goes back on it, thus excluding them when he said: “Our capacity to realize the people’s demands through civilized and enlightened dialogue.” It is not the Egyptians that are going to realize the Egyptians’ demands. “OUR” excludes Egyptians because it includes politicians, who usually do not realize the demands of Egyptians. The expressions, “We will prove that we are not followers of anybody, that we do not take instructions from anybody,” do not seem to involve the Egyptians per se. The DPE was actually referring to politicians, who the people know are not independent from foreign interference and decision making.

In sum, both at the level of framing and pronoun system, this speech marked a departure. At last, the events were framed by the DPE as a serious “crisis” calling for deep political “change.” The Egyptians have been framed metaphorically in terms of the kinship system. At the level of pronouns, YOU appears for the first time to be filled with the youth at Tahrir Square.

## 5. Discussion

Framing in the three speeches under study is guilty of misrepresenting the situation in Egypt. Persistence in reproducing this misrepresentation in two speeches is an attempt to maintain the status quo as if saying that something does not exist makes it cease to exist. As is clear in the slogans, what happened in Egypt was not a demonstration. As a carrier of counter-framing, the slogans resisted the official version of framing, which framed the situation as demonstrations in two consecutive speeches, which was then reframed as “a crisis,” “critical times,” “a critical moment,” and “a difficult current crossroad.” However, this kind of manipulative framing was not any closer to the truth on the ground, which was not able to stand for long in the face of change. Slogans and resistance in the streets were able to impose through action on the ground the real framing of the events. On the very same day of the ultimate speech, one billboard in Tahrir Square had the slogan “LEAVE” written in Chinese in a sarcastic gesture to tell the DPE that if he did not understand that he should quit in Arabic, English, and French, then perhaps he could understand that in Chinese.<sup>17</sup>

At the level of personal pronouns, Íñigo-Mora (2004: 28) argues that “the way in which the pronouns are actually used in context can show the kind of social and

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<sup>17</sup> Language Log, “Maybe Mubarak understands Chinese,” February 10, 2011. (<http://language.log.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=2956>).

political relationship between addresser and addressee/s.” By extension, the way language is used can tell us a lot about sociopolitical relations of power. In the Egyptian context, the DPE’s speeches represent power and reproduction of dominance while the slogans made by the youth constitute a language of resistance of this power and dominance. The fact that sociopolitical change took place in Egypt testifies to the undeniable role of language as not only an instrument of resistance but, most importantly, as a weapon of change even more powerful than real weapons, since language carries and guides meaning, ideology, and power.

The three speeches witnessed a special manipulation of personal pronouns by the DPE. The first speech showed a fairly balanced distribution between “I” and “WE.” However, as Wilson (1990: 76) argues, since the pronoun system operates in context “it is not surprising to find that politicians make use of pronouns to good effect: To indicate, accept, deny or distance themselves from responsibility for political action; to reveal ideological bias; to encourage solidarity; to designate and identify those who are supporters (with us) as well as those who are enemies (against us); and to present specific idiosyncratic aspects of the individual politician’s own personality.” Indeed, even though apparently the DPE is using as many “I” and “WE,” the truth of the matter is that most of the instances of “WE” do not include Egyptians, thus distancing Egyptians from himself. If you add this to the egocentric uses of “I,” it becomes clear that the DPE was individualistic and antisocial in his speeches. The problem with “WE” is that it only gives the impression of inclusiveness to people, who cognitively cannot take their time to think about whether they are actually included in the filling. Cognition works at an incredible speed. Because of this, “WE” is more manipulative and ideological than “I” and “YOU.”

In the second speech, the situation is different with regard to the use of “WE.” The reason for the dominance of “I” is that we are dealing with someone who was so much used to power that he felt that Egyptians would think twice before getting rid of him. It was with the last speech that a big change occurred, and the DPE started using “YOU” in addressing Egyptians. The other peculiarity of this speech is that it also includes 61 instances of “I” against only 28 instances of “WE.”

Looking across the speeches, it is interesting to note that the three speeches included 121 instances of “I” against 65 instances of “We” and only 15 instances of “YOU.” This is very telling. The DPE is a self-centered, individualistic, and egocentric old man. He did not feel the need to make communality with the rest of Egyptians, and the only time he addressed them as having personhood was in the last speech. Politics is the domain in the Arab world where individualism is practiced in a collectivist culture.

## **Conclusion**

In this article, I have tried to show how both the language of slogans and the language used in three political speeches is correlated with sociopolitical change in a collectivist society. The former type of language resisted power and ideology while the latter resisted change. In particular, the resistance of the speeches to change was made through refusal to admit reality and frame it as it was not, on the one hand, and through the choice and manipulation of pronouns, on the other.

The following table sums up most of the data related to person deixis in the three speeches analyzed, and will be compared to the data which will be reproduced from Maalej (2012:695):

**Table 1: Pronoun frequency and distribution in the three speeches of the DPE**

<b>Topic</b>	<b>Antepenultimate Speech</b>	<b>Penultimate speech</b>	<b>Ultimate speech</b>
<b>Word count</b>	1266 words	1113 words	1952 words
<b>Pronouns count</b>	57	40	104
<b>Percentage of pronouns</b>	3.8%	2.66%	6.93%
<b>Pronoun choice</b>	I-WE	I-WE	I- WE-YOU
<b>Distribution of pronouns</b>	I (29) WE (28) THEY (7)	I (31) WE (9) THEY (1)	I (61) WE (28) YOU (15) THEY (2)
<b>Frequency per word</b>	I (43.65 words) WE (45.21 words)	I (35.90 words) WE (123.66 words)	I (32) WE (69.71) YOU (130.16)
<b>Overall pronoun frequency</b>	22.21 words	27.82 words	18.76 words

**Table 2: Comparison of pronoun frequency and distribution in the three speeches of the OPT**

<b>Topic</b>	<b>Antepenultimate speech</b>	<b>Penultimate speech</b>	<b>Ultimate speech</b>
<b>Word count</b>	851 words	1474 words	1190 words
<b>Pronoun count</b>	29	45	96
<b>I</b>	1	3	35
<b>YOU</b>	1	2	18
<b>WE</b>	24	35	36
<b>THEY</b>	3	5	7
<b>Pronoun frequency of occurrence</b>	29.34 words	32.75 words	12.39 words

Far from generalizations on the correlations between the quality of person deixis and being ousted as a president, a comparison of the data in the foregoing tables shows the following. The DPE's use of the pronoun "I" far outnumbers that of the OPT's (121 against 39 instances), which has been explained in this article as egocentricity on the part of the DPE, with the result that the OPT as less self-centered in his last three speeches. As discussed in Maalej (2012), the OPT showed a progressive use of the pronoun "YOU" (1-2-18 instances), which was explained in Maalej (2012) as progression towards seeking solidarity with and closeness to the people throughout his speeches. The DPE, however, only used the pronoun fifteen times in the ultimate speech, which can be interpreted as a late realization of the existence of the Egyptian people in the language of the DPE. Furthermore, the OPT showed more frequency in the use of "WE" (24-35-36 instances) while the DPE showed less frequency (28-9-28 instances), which was correlated in Maalej (2012) with solidarity with people by including them with him. In the current article, the use of "WE" by the DPE has been shown to include more Royal-WE than inclusive WE. With both former presidents, the use of "THEY" was less significant than the other pronouns although its use by the OPT was more divisive (in constructing an out-group) than with the DPE. Overall, although the OPT showed adaptation of the pronouns to the political balance of power, the DPE showed less flexibility and kept manipulating the pronouns to his account and that of his party.

Indeed, framing the events in Egypt as demonstrations, a crisis, critical times, a critical moment, a difficult current crossroad were all attempts to misrepresent reality and undermine a genuine revolution against social, economic, and political humiliation. Denying as a way of paving the ground for misrepresentation is afforded by politicians and powerful people to dominate the less powerful. Framing Egyptians as scared of the events, the DPE as their father, and Egypt as a mother were meant to dominate the Egyptians. However, all these framings were ineffective tactics on the part of the DPE to misrepresent reality and appeal to the emotions of Egyptians. On the contrary, such framings were thought to have aroused by violence-provoking negative emotions of anger, disgust, and intolerance. Such negative emotions in the case of Egypt were not translated on the ground as physical violence but as linguistic slogans against the DPE, his son, and some of his ministers.

The use of the pronouns acted as a reinforcement of this misrepresentation of reality by coupling it with manipulation, deception, and propaganda. In enumerating his own achievements, the DPE wanted to manipulate the Egyptians' opinion about him as a hero. In saying that he never took his orders from abroad, he was deceiving Egyptians into believing that he was an independent politician thinking about the interests of Egyptians and Egypt. In telling Egyptians that he was working for the well-being of the homeland, he was giving them a piece of propaganda which everybody knew was a lie. All these did not manage to dupe the Egyptians in the streets, and make them persuaded by his rhetoric. Their experience of real exclusion made Egyptians a prey to unemployment, poverty, and illiteracy, which marginalized them in their own country.

Thus, framing and pronouns have been shown to be in the service of power, dominance, and misrepresentation. One of the most important contributions of this study was to show that these speeches have been resisted through other media, where the youth of Egypt have anchored themselves "discursively" on Facebook and Twitter, built a shared ideology that countered the official one, thus constructing in-groups



among themselves and resisting the framing in the speeches to peacefully make sociopolitical change possible. Change in the sense of regime change was also possible owing to the breakdown of what Levinson (2006: 85) calls the “interaction engine” between governor and governed.

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